

Published Reviews:

Just and Unjust Military Intervention: European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill.

Review by Gilles Andréani (Survival)

Reviews by D. Boucher, J. Monten, and N. Onuf (H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable)

Review by Vikash Chandra (St. Antony's International Review)

Review by Fabian Klose (Sehepunkte, IN GERMAN)

Review by Cian O'Driscoll (International Affairs)

Review by Matt Preston (Journal of Military and Strategic Studies)

Review by Karl Walling (Library of Law & Liberty)

authors in their historical context, and to show how their views of international relations were shaped by their own experience. That approach is particularly illuminating when it comes to Locke, whose political thought as exposed in his *Two Treatises of Government* is presented alongside his colonial activity as a member of the Board of Trade, which oversaw transatlantic commerce, and as a contributor to the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina.

A further benefit of this approach is to take the reader on an intellectual journey tracing the development of global connections among peoples in the maritime age. A precursor to globalisation, that age saw fundamental questions emerge as to which law ought to govern the growing interactions across the globe. In a fascinating chapter, Armitage describes how Jeremy Bentham pursued answers to these questions, developing in the process two attitudes which put him ahead of his time (and of most of his followers): scepticism about colonisation, and faith in a universal international law.

These attitudes contrast with the contradiction inherent in Locke's defence of liberty within Britain, and of empire abroad. Of course, Locke was not alone in adopting contradictory positions: Burke famously acquiesced to the cause of independence for America, yet promoted counter-revolutionary intervention against France. Hobbes saw no higher political objective than the establishment of civil peace within national borders, while resigning himself to the pursuit of a state of nature more or less equivalent to a permanent state of war among nations.

The only mild shadow of criticism one might dare to cast over this profound and erudite work is that Armitage could have given more room to the critics of some of his authors: in particular, in the chapter on Hobbes, one misses a mention of his most determined adversary, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who denounced 'the horrible system of Hobbes' which, as Rousseau saw it, justified the loss of freedom within, as well as war abroad.

Just and Unjust Military Intervention: European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill

Stefano Recchia and Jennifer M. Welsh, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. £60.00/\$99.00. 306 pp.

The sustained interest in the history of political thought as applied to international affairs, and the quality of research in that field, is amply demonstrated not only by *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (reviewed above), but by this small volume of essays edited by Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh, respectively University Lecturer at the University of Cambridge, and Professor at the European University Institute, Florence, both in international relations.

Just and Unjust Military Intervention comprises 12 chapters mostly devoted to classical thinkers' views of the propriety of intervention: specific chapters focus on, among others, Francisco de Vitoria (by William Bain); John Locke (by Samuel Moyn); Emer de Vattel (by Jennifer Pitts); David Hume and Adam Smith (by Edwin van de Haar); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel (by Pierre Hassner); Edmund Burke (by Jennifer Welsh); Giuseppe Mazzini (by Stefano Recchia); and J.S. Mill (by Michael Doyle).

While the intellectual quality of the contributions is generally of the highest order, the challenge of the book was to come up with a concept of 'intervention' that could stand up against the changing background of war and peace through four centuries of European history. The book claims to be concerned with 'military intervention motivated at least in part by humanitarian purposes, or ethical concerns' (p. 21), which does not confine the subject to modern humanitarian intervention alone, but also seems to include the 'just war' tradition.

While the definition excludes counter-revolutionary intervention of the type pursued by the Holy Alliance from 1815, and by Russia later in the nineteenth century, the book nevertheless devotes a chapter to Burke, who justified intervention against revolutionary France. Likewise, it is not entirely clear whether the book was meant to include quasi-colonial interventions against non-European powers or the Ottoman Empire before its downfall, which, while often justified on humanitarian grounds (such as the expeditions against the Barbary pirates or the 1830 conquest of Algiers), frequently bore the mark of imperialism.

Beyond these uncertainties, there is enough scope to revisit the views of classical political thinkers in light of contemporary debates on intervention, which they often echo and enlighten. Mill's thoughts on (and general reluctance towards) intervention are extraordinarily relevant in view of the debates which have raged over Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. That consideration is enough to fully justify the project, and the resulting book is, by any measure, a remarkable accomplishment.

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism

John Breuilly, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
£95.00/\$185.00. 824 pp.

Nationalism continues to be one of the most powerful ideas and political forces at work in the twenty-first century. Yet its content, and even its definition, remain a matter of uncertainty, and of considerable scholarly debate. Indeed, it is a field in which it has been virtually impossible to separate the politics from the intellectual debate, since the political entrepreneurs known as nationalists

H-Diplo | ISSF

Roundtable, Volume VII, No. 12 (2015)



A production of H-Diplo with the journals *Security Studies*, *International Security*, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, and the International Studies Association's Security Studies Section (ISSS).

<http://www.issforum.org>

H-Diplo/ISSF Editors: **James McAllister, Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse**

H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable and Web/Production Editor: **George Fujii**

Introduction by James McAllister

Stefano Recchia and Jennifer M. Welsh. *Just and Unjust Military Intervention: European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. ISBN: 9781107042025 (hardback, \$99.00).

Published by H-Diplo/ISSF on **2 February 2015**

Permalink: <http://issforum.org/roundtables/7-12-just-and-unjust-military-intervention>

PDF URL: <http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-7-12.pdf>

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Introduction by James McAllister, Williams College

J*ust and Unjust Military Intervention* is a superb collection of essays by leading scholars examining the continuing relevance of the political thought of classical thinkers such as John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Edmund Burke, and John Stuart Mill among others. Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh, the editors of the volume, are quite conscious of the central issue involved in any research project that seeks to explore the contemporary relevance of classical thought. While they are sympathetic to the “contextualist” viewpoint of Quentin Skinner, which is skeptical of the idea that classic texts can be of much use to understanding the present, Recchia and Welsh believe that there are several reasons to believe that “a close reading of classic texts can enhance our understanding of intervention, in terms of both its origins and its controversial status in international society” (6).

It should not be surprising that the reviewers have a mixed assessment of the virtues and limitations of the volume. Jonathan Monten is the most enthusiastic reviewer, arguing that the book “will contribute not only to building a richer contemporary moral theory of intervention, but to a better understanding of the practical consequences of intervention as well.” While certainly critical of some aspects of the project, Nicholas Onuf believes that the book is “a work of careful scholarship and considered judgment.”

Onuf and David Boucher do raise some important points of concern about the book. Boucher questions Recchia and Welsh’s interpretations of Skinner and contextualism. In addition, he believes that the volume lacks “a thorough-going consideration of how the law of nations and early international law, implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, stratified the world into gradations of civilization, but also divided the globe spatially into different spheres.” Despite the hopes of the editors that their efforts will help scholars to think about contemporary issues of military intervention, Onuf argues that the volume falls short on this score. In his view, “None of the contributors so much as hints that she or he has found a missing key to present dilemmas.”

H-Diplo/ISSF thanks Professor’s Recchia and Welsh and all of the reviewers for advancing an important debate over the continuing relevance of classical political thought on military intervention.

Participants:

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Urbinati) of *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation-Building, and International Relations* (Princeton UP, 2009).

Jennifer M. Welsh is Professor and Chair in International Relations at the European University Institute and a Senior Research Fellow at Somerville College, University of Oxford. She was previously a Professor in International Relations at the University of Oxford, and co-director of the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. In 2013, she was appointed by the UN Secretary General to serve as his Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. Prof. Welsh is the author, co-author, and editor of several books and articles on international relations, the evolution of the notion of the 'responsibility to protect' in international society, the UN Security Council, and Canadian foreign policy.

David Boucher is Professor of Political Philosophy and International Relations at Cardiff University. He is the author of numerous books, including *The Social and Political Thought of R.G. Collingwood*, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present*, and *Dylan and Cohen: Poets of Rock and Roll*.

Jonathan Monten is currently a Lecturer at University College London. He previously taught at the University of Oklahoma. His research and teaching interests are in the areas of international relations, international security, and U.S. foreign policy. His work has appeared in a number of peer-reviewed journals, including *International Security*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Security Studies*, *Perspectives and Politics*, and *Global Governance*.

Nicholas Onuf, PhD, is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Florida International University, Miami. He is the author of *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, *International Legal Theory: Essays and Engagements, 1996-2006*, and (with Peter Onuf) *Nations, Markets, and War: Modern History and the American Civil War*.

The connecting thread of this collection of essays, which is implicit throughout, is the concern of classic jurists and political theorists over three centuries or so to subject conflict between states to legal constraints, whether by natural law, the law of nations, or international law. In particular, the authors of each contribution attempt to identify the arguments for constraint in military and humanitarian intervention for the purpose of illuminating and contributing to present debates (73).

G.W. F. Hegel famously remarked in his lectures on the philosophy of history that the one thing we learn from history is that we learn nothing from history. The editors of this volume throw down the gauntlet, and by implication challenge Hegel's contention. They claim that there are indeed lessons to be learned, not directly, but by shedding light on similar problems in the past that may help us to think through our own. Before we can learn the lessons we have to understand what the authors meant in and by what they wrote. In other words, a proper historical study must be undertaken to determine what was said before we can apply its lessons to current problems.

What has prompted this methodological self-justification, one may ask? The editors tell us that they agree with Quentin Skinner in believing that authors have to be interpreted in their appropriate contexts to elicit their intended meanings. This they call the "Contextualist Challenge" (5), and they accept it in so far as they wish to determine whether past thinkers accepted, rejected or revised prevailing ideas and conventions relating to intervention at the time they wrote. They nevertheless think Skinner sets the bar a little too high and that it is impossible to be certain about an author's intentions. All we can hope to do is approximate a re-enactment of authorial intentions. On a more fundamental level they contest Skinner's purported rejection of the efficacy of classic texts for providing inspiration for our present thinking (6).

As a characterisation of contextualism this is mistaken. The term re-enactment is an allusion to R. G. Collingwood, who argued that historical knowledge is achieved by re-enacting the very same thoughts as those who we seek to understand.¹ Skinner takes much from Collingwood, and indeed calls himself a 'Collingwoodian', but he is quite explicit about rejecting the idea of re-enactment on the (mistaken) grounds that it rests on an intuitionist theory of knowledge. What he accepts, however, is that ideas are related to historically specific complexes of questions and answers, and therefore there are no perennial problems in philosophy. The implication of this is not that different discussions of the state, such as those of Plato and Hobbes, are discrete and unrelated to each other. Plato and Hobbes were not giving answers to the same question, but they were nevertheless related by being part of the same historical process, that is, the process by which one conception turns into another.²

¹ R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, revised edition, ed. Jan van der Dussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 282-302

² R. G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography and other writings*, ed., David Boucher and Teresa Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 61-3; and Q. Skinner, "The rise of, challenge to and prospects for a

This is the very thing that David Trim does in the first essay (Intervention in European history, c. 1520-1850). He traces the process by which one conception of intervention turned into another over a period of three hundred years. Edwin van de Haar, in his contribution, “David Hume and Adam Smith on International Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention,” takes the question of whether there is a right or even a duty to intervene “as one of the perennial questions in international relations, which in some form or another has been debated throughout the past four or more centuries” (155).

Ariel Colonomos, in “War in the Face of Doubt: Early Modern Classics and the Preventative Use of Force,” on the other hand, takes the arguments of Suarez, Gentile, Grotius and Vattel on preventative and pre-emptive intervention and identifies contemporary parallels on the grounds of resemblance, as if the ideas are like coins which pass from hand to hand without losing their value. For example, he contends that Gentili’s distinction between what is meditated and what is prepared by the enemy as considerations in pre-emptive attacks “resembles debates in contemporary international relations between ‘intentions’ and ‘capabilities’” (57).

The danger in comparing the conclusions of arguments on the basis of resemblance is that the reasons for reaching those conclusions are much more important and are what differentiate thinkers from each other. We may, for example, compare Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, both advocates of absolute sovereignty, but the reasons they gave were very different, reflecting quite diverse traditions of thought, the former the prescriptive or normative natural law manner of thinking, and the latter the descriptive, or empirical. William Bain’s chapter, “Vitoria: The Law of War, Saving the Innocent and the Image of God,” demonstrates the importance of being sensitive to identifying the reasons for conclusions. Vitoria’s justification for saving the innocent is presented on less than one page, and it is to Vitoria’s presuppositions that Bain looks both for the reasons and justification. This requires broadening the perspective to the wider theory, and thus departing from what the editors claim, that is, that the book does not give an exhaustive or authoritative interpretation of each thinker’s international theory (11). In order to get at the reasons for positing a duty to intervene (albeit an imperfect duty) we cannot avoid delving into the wider context, perhaps not the universe as whole,³ but at least the political theory that sustains the conclusions at the fundamental level.

There is nothing wrong with looking at past theories with a view to casting light on our current predicaments. Indeed, both Collingwood and Skinner, far from denying the contemporary relevance of past ideas actually formulate good arguments to the contrary. For Collingwood the purpose of history is self-knowledge of the mind. He means that learning about what and how people think helps us to look at present intractable problems

Collingwoodian approach to the history of political thought,” in Dario Castiglione and Iain Hampsher-Monk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 175-88.

³ Michael Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), 3-8.

in a new light, offering us new potentialities.⁴ This is exactly Skinner's position, and he uses the neo-Roman, or republican, conception of liberty to illuminate and offer a possible way forward from the ossified dualism of negative and positive liberty made famous by Isaiah Berlin. Skinner argues, "Equipped with a broader sense of possibility, we can stand back from intellectual commitments we have inherited and ask ourselves in a new spirit of enquiry what we should think of them."⁵

Principles of intervention may be justified from a number of different perspectives and a framework of such perspectives, in my view, constitutes the appropriate context in which to understand particular arguments, but also to allow us to compare them with others. There can be little doubt, for example, that thinkers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes employed universal principles to consider the utility of military intervention. There are many nuances that may be added, but the fundamental assumption they employed is that of a fixed human nature in which will, and not reason, is the volitional force. Human nature, while universal, is capable of modification through human artifice. All three thinkers, for example, had different views on intervention, but the principle remains the same, what must be done is for the security of the state, not for the well-being of mankind. Power, and the danger of overstressing it, was of paramount concern. Considerations of morality are subordinate to, or conflated with expediency. Morality is made rather than discovered or apprehended. Some of these elements are well brought out by Colonomos's discussion of Gentili, the sixteenth century Italian Jurist and philosopher working at Oxford. He justifies both preventative and pre-emptive strikes on the grounds of necessity. The prince must strike out against the roots of the growing plant. Colonomos argues that subjective, rather than objective, judgements may be used in justification of intervention and that "'defence dictated by expediency' may justify war based on the 'fear that we may ourselves be attacked'" (55).

The most dominant manner of thinking, certainly up until the eighteenth century, viewed the source of morality emanating from an altogether different place, outside of humanity, an objective standard, but to which nevertheless humanity was subject. According to the law, either in Plato's realm of Being, or in Christian theology where God is the source, morality and law are not made but apprehended by right reason. It is a declaratory tradition. There is a widespread belief that reason itself takes the place of God, and that the source of obligation is rooted in the grounding force of rational argument. There is an element of this secularisation in Vattel, but certainly not, for example, in Grotius, who is said to be the paradigmatic case of the secularisation of the natural law tradition and the inaugurator of natural right. Nothing could be further from the truth. Grotius, in wanting to subject all nations to law, was at pains to 'demonstrate' the power of reason in discovering the truths of morality. He was also well aware that not all of us have equal capacity to discover such truths. Even the most indolent are obliged to follow the precepts of natural law, not because

⁴ R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, new edition, ed. Jan van der Dussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

⁵ Quentin Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 117.

they are the conclusion of reason, but because they are the laws of God written in men's hearts. Reason in itself cannot oblige us to do anything. This aspect of the natural law manner of thinking is brought out admirably by William Bain in his chapter on Vitoria. Vitoria justifies the right to save the innocent by referring to God's command "to love thy neighbour as thyself" (71). The idea that your neighbour is part of the same moral community, and that this community transcends geographical boundaries, enables Vitoria to conceive of the American Indians as neighbours to whom we have a duty of defence against tyranny and oppression. This is consistent with his principle that the sole just cause for war is the infliction of harm. Bain contends that the character of Vitoria's argument is generally lost on international relations scholars who tend to be blind to the theological underpinnings of his arguments (80). The same criticism may be made in relation to most natural law and natural rights thinkers.

This manner of thinking has generated some perverse conclusions. While its standards are universal, in application it ends up with some rather severe judgements, in that so few peoples in the world comply with its standards, and far from being a liberating force it often turns into a tool of oppression. The perversity of this tradition certainly should have been better represented in the book. Perhaps the most perverse, and for a while quite influential, thinker was the Aristotelian scholar Juan Ginés Sepúlveda.⁶ He argues that all men by Divine command and Natural Law are obliged to save innocent victims from slaughter, on the proviso that no significant disadvantage should be suffered by the intervening force. The Indians, in his view, needed to be subjected to the government of Spain, which abhorred widespread human sacrifice by the Indians, and committed itself to stamping the practice out. Intervening by waging war against the Indians was to protect the weak from enduring barbaric practices. We are obliged by Divine and Natural Law to draw back to salvation even those whose errors, knowingly or unwittingly, lead them to destruction. All sound men have a duty to drag them, even against their will, to salvation. Sepúlveda contends that: 'the barbarians are rightfully compelled to justice for the sake of their salvation.'⁷ We have a duty to intervene, then, not only to save lives, but to save souls.

For Sepúlveda, crimes in breach of the Natural Law, such as devil worship, cannibalism, the burial alive of important persons and even worse, horrified civilized peoples, and justified intervention by the Spanish in order to save innocent people. On these grounds alone, God and nature confer the right "to wage war against these barbarians to submit them to Spanish rule." The Indians should be forced to "change their lives and adopt the obligations of Natural

⁶ Lewis Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), 41.

⁷ Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, *Apology for the Book On the Just Causes of War: Dedicated to the Most Learned and Distinguished President, Antonio Ramirez, Bishop of Segovia*, trans. Lewis D. Epstein (unpublished, Bowdoin College, USA, 1973), 18.

Law.”⁸ This is a form of humanitarian intervention, with just as committed beliefs about salvation, that many extremist groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Boko Haram in Nigeria, believe themselves to be undertaking.

A third manner of thinking about intervention does not assume universal principles, although no thinker is immune from invoking such devices when there is nothing else at hand. Here the assumption is that conduct, interaction, trade, trust, shared practices, and elements of a common culture give rise to constraints which constitute a moral code. Within the state many of the rules may emerge in common law, while at the international level customary international law provides the basis of international morality. While it is true that such thinkers as Grotius believed that the practices of states did indeed give rise to a law of nations, it was nevertheless compared with the natural law, and should not be in fundamental violation of it. The elements of this manner of thinking are brought out well by Jennifer Welsh in her discussion of Edmund Burke, one of the most enigmatic of international theorists (Edmund Burke and intervention: empire and neighbourhood). Welsh demonstrates both the pragmatic appeal to universal principles, when Burke wanted to indict Warren Hastings, the Governor General of Bengal, of flagrantly violating the principles of the British constitution, the cultural and political traditions of India, and the universal laws of morality. Arbitrary government, he went as far as to suggest, was both dangerous and unnatural.

When it came to Europe, however, Burke worked very much within the paradigm of historical reason. Europe had a common civilisation based on religion and the manners of a gentleman, with shared practices and sympathies. Self-imposed constraints had made war altogether a more civilised, if necessary form of conduct. The threat posed by the French, deluded by universal principles of natural right, to the ‘Commonwealth of Europe’ constituted a danger to the customary law of Europe. This law was manifest in such institutions as the balance of power, violation of which threatened, the safety and peace of its inhabitants, giving just cause for war, which extended both a right and duty to intervene militarily on humanitarian grounds. These arguments are best considered in Burke’s writings on the regicide peace, when the imminent danger to Europe loomed largest. Welsh, quite rightly, emphasises this “historical” morality when she argues that “Burke’s law of nations did not apply universally, but only to those countries which actively participated in Europe’s common civilisation” (226). Nations and territories outside of Europe, such as the Ottoman Empire were deemed outside of the community of rights and duties that constituted Europe, which did not make them immune from being judged by those standards.

What the book is missing is a thorough-going consideration of how the law of nations and early international law, implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, stratified the world into gradations of civilisation, but also divided the globe spatially into different spheres. The implications need to be drawn out of Carl Schmitt’s powerful contention that ‘continental

⁸ Lewis Hank, *All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation Between Bartolome de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on the Religious and Intellectual Capacity of the American Indians* (DeKalb, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 86 and 118.

European international law since the sixteenth century, the *jus publicum Europeum*, originally and essentially was law among *states*, among European sovereigns.⁹ The effect was that the world was divided between the old European world whose order was maintained by the public law of Europe, and the newly emerging new world that considered free space 'open to occupation and expansion'.¹⁰

In conclusion, then, we may detect in the history of international theory that within the three broad ways of thinking about intervention general principles are invoked, and these general principles are articulated at varying levels of generality, universal in the case of those who subscribe to the ideas of will and artifice, but highly particularistic in its implications. There is no common good, only specific interests that may pragmatically converge or just as easily diverge. Those who subscribe to something like the idea of an historically evolving reason, are capable of viewing an evolving moral community, that in the period covered by this book constitutes Europe, with rather tenuous attempts to extend it to the Americas, Australasia and Africa. Those principles that purported to be universal, never were, because being human was a fundamental qualification for enjoying such rights, and what was at issue was what constituted being fully human. Women, in particular, fell, and in vast parts of the world still fall, foul of this criterion.

⁹ Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Ius Publicum Europeum*, trans. G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos, 2006), 126.

¹⁰ Schmitt, *Nomos of the Earth*, 87.

Review by Jonathan Monten, University of Oklahoma

In the wake of U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with many in the international community calling for action in the ongoing humanitarian crises in Syria and elsewhere, the issue of intervention is high on the international agenda. Scholars, writers, and policymakers are struggling to articulate a set of standards for international intervention that balance respect for state sovereignty with the need to safeguard the rights of individuals. *Just and Unjust Military Intervention* makes an interesting contribution to this debate by bringing together analyses of a diverse group of historical thinkers who have all addressed the question of intervention in some form.

According to the book's editors, Stefano Recchia and Jennifer M. Welsh, debates over foreign military intervention have historically turned on two questions. First, under what conditions is intervention legitimate? Second, what are the likely effects of intervention on both the intervening and target states? Recchia and Welsh's introductory chapter discusses the potential problems in taking the writings of classical European thinkers out of the historical context in which they were embedded and applying them to modern international issues, but concludes that these texts can still contribute to our contemporary understanding of intervention.¹ An informative chapter by David Trim discusses the linguistic and conceptual origins of the term 'intervention,' and traces how the practice evolved in Europe, beginning with interventions on behalf of co-religionists in the sixteenth century, and continued even after the Westphalian system of sovereignty came into effect in the seventeenth century.² Subsequent chapters explore how individual thinkers approached the question of foreign intervention. This format allows for a very focused comparison across a diverse group of thinkers not normally considered together. Several chapters explore theorists who are often overlooked by contemporary international relations scholars, such as John Locke, Edmund Burke, and John Stuart Mill.

I'd like to highlight one additional theme in this collection of essays. Many of the chapters focus on the ways in which classical thinkers evaluated foreign intervention based on theories of justice or by developing moral or ethical criteria for when the norm of nonintervention should be violated. Yet many of these thinkers' judgments also relied, explicitly or implicitly, on causal theories of the likely outcomes of foreign interventions. In the chapter on Mill, for example, Michael Doyle highlights the "consequentialist character of the ethics of both nonintervention and intervention" in Mill's writing, and that "it makes a difference whether we think that an intervention will do more good than harm" (264).³ Similarly, Recchia writes that Giuseppe Mazzini recognized that "principled morality in international relations always needs to be combined with a more prudential type of

¹ "Introduction: The Enduring Relevance of Classical Thinkers," 1-20.

² "Intervention in European History, c. 1520-1850," 21-47.

³ "J.S. Mill on Nonintervention and Intervention," 263-287.

reasoning, to have a realistic chance of improving the human condition in a highly imperfect world” (262).⁴

In my reading, the main consequentialist arguments regarding whether foreign military intervention can foster meaningful liberal change in the economic and political institutions of targeted states evolved over the period covered in the book. Many of the theorists in the book were pessimistic on this question, but differed in their explanations as to why. Eighteenth century theorists such as Adam Smith, David Hume, and Edmund Burke seem to have stressed the importance of deep economic and cultural conditions in their view that imperial interventions were unlikely to become vehicles for liberal change in foreign societies, while also highlighting the illiberal internal effects of prolonged interventions on the European imperial powers themselves. Extrapolating from Hume and Smith’s economic writing, Edwin van de Haar’s chapter describes their view that societies pass through stages of economic development, but that progress through these stages cannot be expedited by external intervention.⁵ Instead, Smith and Hume believed that free trade and other forms of peaceful international exchange were more likely than coercion to advance individual liberty in illiberal societies. In the case of Burke, although he favored military intervention during the French Revolution and criticized abuses of power within the British empire, he believed that liberal values were not universal, but were built on a particular European cultural and civilizational foundation. Burke was therefore pessimistic that liberal values could be spread to or sustained in states that lacked this social background. Welsh suggests that from a Burkean perspective it is unsurprising that “The liberal zone of peace today largely remains culturally bound” (236).⁶

Mid-nineteenth century liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and Giuseppe Mazzini offered a different theoretical perspective on intervention and liberalism. Both addressed the question of intervention in the context of European self-determination movements challenging multi-national states and empires. In Recchia’s account, Mazzini advanced several distinct causal arguments explaining why military interventions on behalf of national self-determination movements (and pro-democracy movements in general) were unlikely to result in democratic change: great powers often have mixed motives for intervening; leaders brought to power by foreign forces may become dependent on external support and thus discredited or find they are unable to build their own domestic coalitions; and self-government could not be sustained unless it was achieved by the effort and sacrifice of a political community.⁷ Mill developed a very similar causal logic in defending a general policy of noninterference, writing that “The liberty which is bestowed

⁴ “The Origins of Liberal Wilsonianism: Giuseppe Mazzini on Regime Change and Humanitarian Intervention,” 237-262.

⁵ “David Hume and Adam Smith on International Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention,” 154-175.

⁶ “Edmund Burke and Intervention: Empire and Neighborhood,” 219-236.

⁷ “The Origins of Liberal Wilsonianism: Giuseppe Mazzini on Regime Change and Humanitarian Intervention,” 237-262.

on [a people] by other hands than their own, will have nothing real, nothing permanent” (quoted on 251).⁸

These chapters highlight a central tension in liberal internationalism between a commitment to noninterference and a commitment to universal liberal goals such as strengthening human rights, building more democratic political institutions, and preventing or halting state-sponsored violence against civilians. Yet we currently lack a well-developed set of theories on the conditions under which military intervention or other forms of international coercion are likely to advance these liberal goals. By exploring how European thinkers approached this question in past eras, *Just and Unjust Military Intervention* will contribute not only to building a richer contemporary moral theory of intervention, but to a better understanding of the practical consequences of intervention as well.

⁸ “J.S. Mill on Nonintervention and Intervention,” 263-287.

Context and Relevance

As editors, Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh have set themselves and the contributors to *Just and Unjust Military Intervention* a difficult task: speak to the present by reviewing the work of a series of European thinkers, dating from the early decades of the sixteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century. On the one hand, Recchia and Welsh hope “not to uproot the classical thinkers’ arguments from their social, political, and intellectual environment.” On the other hand, they assume that “re-reading the classics can assist us”—themselves and the rest of us—“in developing *our own approaches* to the particular dilemmas surrounding intervention in our own time” (20, their emphasis). Are these goals—contextual sensitivity and contemporary relevance—even compatible? The editors argue that we should not worry on this score, and for three reasons.

First: “From the sixteenth century onward, princes and states have sent their troops to fight in foreign lands against the will of foreign rulers, and in many instances the justification for doing so has been the appalling acts of those local rulers” (6). I will return to this well-taken point later. For now I will confine myself to two observations: It tells us nothing about the problem of uprooting classical thinkers—if anything, it implies there is no problem because the reason for intervention has never changed. Yet the phrase “princes and states” glosses over a significant shift, even a disjuncture, in agency—the “person” sending troops has changed, even if the reason has not.

Second: “the particular thinkers showcased here have all played an important part in constituting the kind of international society we have today—one that is now based on a universal ideal of sovereign equality, but which evolved from a European ‘core’ and still has embedded within it notions of hierarchy and exclusion” (7). However apt this quick and dirty characterization of international society (I like it pretty well), we should not take for granted that our showcased thinkers “played an important part” in its constitution. Certainly not all of them did, at least not directly. Arguably few indeed did so, if we go by what they actually said and who, in that context, might have listened.

Insofar as later writers invoke earlier ones, we are better able to see the constitutive process at work. I suspect this happened less often than we would like to think, despite, for example, Immanuel Kant’s offhand remark about sorry comforters. When later writers did invoke earlier ones, they tended to do so selectively, anachronistically, producing an interpretive patchwork to support a judgment in the context of the later moment. What we end up seeing is a cumulative change in opinion over an extended period of time, to which we then add our own anachronistic judgments, with a cumulative effect on what people do. Constitutive processes often foster an interpretive bias that is distinctly Whiggish and so very characteristic of the contemporary discourse on intervention: things are getting better, though (as Kant foresaw) it has not been easy.

Third: “participants in current debates over the legitimacy of military intervention, whichever side they endorse, can benefit from consulting the arguments of classical European philosophers and jurists” (8). What kind of help are we talking about? Since debates are exercises in competitive persuasion, participants will get the most help from revered thinkers by dropping names and digging around in texts for relevant tidbits. These are, of course, familiar moves in many constitutive processes—all too familiar in contemporary academic circles and courts of law. Recchia and Welsh realize that they must find something more going on than this, or they will have abandoned context in favor of relevance. Their solution is to identify two issues as relevant today as they were for classical thinkers: “what is the legitimate basis for intervention?” and “what is the likely impact of intervention and what are the associated risks?” (8).

The first question effectively repudiates the first reason the editors give for not worrying when we go all the way back to the sixteenth century: whatever the context, the justification for intervention has never changed. If indeed legitimacy is the issue, then context matters; diverse thinkers are unlikely to agree in principle, and certainly not in detail, on such issues. The second question implies that an ever-changing context will permit nothing more than a factual assessment of any given intervention; whatever else thinkers might have to say is beside the point. As framed, both questions are timeless only because of their abstract formulation.

The first and third reasons the editors offer for their project effectively decide in favor of timeless relevance. The second reason leans toward context but only because the editors argue that European thought exhibits a progressive tendency. The question of compatible goals remains unanswered. Does the book itself—a work of careful scholarship and considered judgment—do what the editors have not? Do its contributors manage to avoid anachronism and still find relevance in what their thinkers have to say? Taken together, do their contributions effectively confirm the progressive bias that I see driving the project, or do they tell another story?

In my view, all of the contributors honor the first goal; they are quite properly wary of anachronism. Most of them fail in the second goal. Not for lack of trying: everyone takes a stab at establishing the contemporary relevance of the thinker or (in a few cases) thinkers they write about. Yet there is something ad hoc, even half-hearted in these efforts. None of the contributors so much as hints that she or he has found a missing key to present dilemmas. There is, after all, no debate going on, no one to score points against, no chance of a dramatic win, no incentive to make any such claim.

Of course, contributors found it harder to make the case of relevance for earlier thinkers. William Bain concludes in his chapter, “Vitoria: the law of war, saving the innocent, and the image of God,” that

Vitoria might provide a starting point for thinking about saving the innocent in contemporary international relations, but his notion of a rationally ordered Christian

universe in which man is created in the image of God is largely unintelligible today, at least on a global scale (94-5).

Now compare this with what Stefano Recchia has to say about Giuseppe Mazzini in his chapter, “The origins of liberal Wilsonianism: Giuseppe Mazzini on regime change and humanitarian intervention”:

The similarities between post-Napoleonic Europe and contemporary international society—combined with Mazzini’s thoroughly modern effort to square a strong belief in national sovereignty and independence with an equally deep commitment to human dignity and equality—may explain why so many of his arguments appear so familiar today (261).

One might suppose that there is a regular progression in intelligibility and familiarity from Francisco de Vitoria in the early sixteenth century to Mazzini in the mid-nineteenth, and thus that the book as a whole is more Whiggish than its contributors. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case. Instead there is an alien “before” (Vitoria, Francisco Suarez and Alberico Gentili), soon, even suddenly, giving way to a long, tumultuous period ushered in by Hugo Grotius (b. 1583) and still haunting G. W. F. Hegel (b. 1770) two centuries later, and then, again suddenly, a familiar “after” (Mazzini, b. 1805; Mill, b. 1806). The thinkers in between—(in order of birth) Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emmerich de Vattel, Adam Smith, Kant, and Edmund Burke—partake in the great transformation from a smallish, status-ordered world of European princes to a world of sovereign states occupying vast stretches of territory across several continents.

This transformation—this coming of the modern age—was an event with so many tangled strands as to elicit wildly different responses—even from the same thinker at different moments. Some of us would divide the transformation more or less by century, thus lumping together Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke (d. 1704) and then Hume (b. 1711), Rousseau, Vattel, Smith, Kant and Burke. Yet even this contrivance (early modern period, then Enlightenment) does little to reduce the ambiguity in perspectives and cacophony of voices. Vattel offers a good example.

Among the most lucid of writers (or, as critics have said, prosaic of thinkers), Vattel titled his hugely influential treatise of 1758 *Droit des gens; ou, Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains*. His concern with the actual conduct of relations anticipates legal positivism despite his claimed allegiance to natural law; that concern reaches back to crowned heads as living sovereigns and forward to nation-states as sovereign abstractions. A difficult writer, Kant is perhaps the best example of all. On Andrew Hurrell’s account, “Revisiting Kant and intervention,” Kant’s work reveals “unresolved tensions” that make him important in our own disordered time (217-18). Less charitably, I would say that Kant’s disordered obscurities minimized his impact as a social theorist in his own time, and that we hardly need reminding that we too face unresolved tensions.

With 150 years of hindsight (John Stuart Mill penned “A Few Words” in 1859; European powers had rejected intervention in the US Civil War by 1864), we can generalize about the great transformation in a way that Kant and his contemporaries could not. Three features stand out. First is the principle of natural equality manifest in the reciprocal relation of rights and duties, instantiated as sovereign equality, and then substantiated within and among sovereign states as liberalism. Second is the rise of romantic sentiment, instantiated in the nation and substantiated as the self-determining nation-state. Third is the rise of positivism, in law displacing naturalist teleology with a clear, practical separation of the domestic and the international.

Despite their latent contradictions, all three features of modernity’s emergence persist today. In my view, they account for the contentious character of the contemporary discourse on intervention. We are no longer as confused as Kant was. We simply disagree on which feature of modernity’s potent brew to honor and promote.

With so much having changed, has everything changed? Recchia and Welsh suggest that the “appalling acts of ... local rulers” (6) have always justified intervention. They may be right, but not in any straightforward way. According to David Trim in his chapter, “Intervention in European history, c.1520—1850,” early modern princes were justified in intervening when some other prince behaved tyrannically—atrociously, appallingly—toward their own people (25-7). Anachronistically we might call the motivation for this kind of intervention a humanitarian impulse or concern; Trim sees the motivation as a concern for the common good. I suggest that status concerns motivated princely intervention. Princes who ordered or even condoned massacres, atrocities, and other appalling acts violated “their subjects’ established liberties and privileges” (26) and thus abused the liberties and privileges of their own high station. Such acts were vicious in the fullest sense—gratuitous, unseemly and so deeply embarrassing to other princes that they, and they alone, could properly intervene, albeit “with utmost reluctance” (Trim again, 45).

By the same token, the European status order denied anyone else the necessary liberties and privileges to restore its integrity. When Richard Tuck says in his chapter, “Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf on humanitarian intervention,” that “the reluctance on the part of Protestant theorists”—John Calvin, Gentili, Grotius—“to concede a right of armed resistance to citizens had the paradoxical effect that they put much more stress on the right of foreign intervention by a foreign ruler than did the scholastics” (102), I see no paradox. For the scholastics, the issue of resistance was abstractly formulated and far removed from worldly affairs. With the onset of religious war, Catholic princes committed appalling acts against Protestant subjects—an unacceptable turn in worldly affairs. In the circumstance, Protestant thinkers favored intervention by Protestant princes over resistance by Protestant subjects because intervention ended tyranny while supporting the prevailing social order; as Martin Luther realized, peasant wars endangered the larger *status quo*.

In the end, resistance won out. The great transformation shattered the old order and culminated in the age of revolutions. Today we condemn tyrants and their appalling deeds, we call them criminals personally responsible for their acts, we applaud their victims for their resistance, we come to victims’ assistance reluctantly, we cheer when tyrants fall from

office and, even more, from what our predecessors would have called their exalted station. Much has changed over the centuries, including our conception of agency, but not a moral sense that privilege has its limits.

Editor's Response by:

Stefano Recchia, University of Cambridge

Jennifer M. Welsh, European University Institute

David Boucher, Jonathan Monten, and Nicholas Onuf have engaged productively, and critically, with our collection of essays on early modern European thought about military intervention. That engagement in many ways validates our initial goal: to encourage renewed reflection on how military intervention has been conceived and debated from as early as the sixteenth century at a time when the discourse around intervention is so passionate and morally charged.

The reviewers raise a set of methodological and substantive issues, whose further discussion will serve to enrich future research on both the particular thinkers highlighted in our volume and the specific questions that concerned these writers.

As for methodology, both Boucher and Onuf argue that although in the book's introduction we acknowledge the importance of historical context, we as editors (along with several of our contributors) nevertheless underestimate just how important such context is for understanding the arguments of early modern thinkers and their contemporary relevance – or lack thereof. As Boucher writes, “the danger in comparing the conclusions of arguments on the basis of resemblance is that the reasons for reaching those conclusions are much more important.”

Our wager in the book is that it is possible to analyze ‘classical’ thinkers in a way that can inform – and indeed strengthen – our own efforts to grapple with the ethical dilemmas raised by military intervention. But in doing so, we strove to avoid distorting those thinkers' intentions. In short, we reject both of the extremes set out by Alasdair Macintyre in his discussion of the relationship of philosophy to the past: i.e., that we can *either* read philosophical works with an effort to make them relevant (and thereby misrepresent them), *or* we can read them on their own terms (and thereby preserve them as “museum pieces”).¹ As we note in the book's introduction (20), our goal is not to confirm or legitimize current assumptions about intervention by identifying superficial similarities with the arguments of early modern thinkers, but rather to rely on the classical thinkers to stand back from present-day intellectual commitments and thus explore the possibility of reconceptualizing and reappraising contemporary problems.

Onuf, while judging favorably our efforts to avoid anachronism, wonders how effectively our contributors have established contemporary relevance. Yet perhaps Onuf conceives of “relevance” in too narrow a sense when pointing out that “none of the contributors so much as hints that she or he has found a missing key to present dilemmas.” The book's main objective, to reiterate, is to get current readers to think differently about present

¹ Alasdair Macintyre, “The relationship of philosophy to its past,” in Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner, eds., *Philosophy in History* (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 31-48 (p. 31).

dilemmas, and highlight how social and political circumstances as well as the broader normative context may influence one's answers, rather than to provide ready-made solutions for particular contemporary problems.

One may further ask why the particular early modern thinkers we chose should be exalted as a valuable window through which to examine current debates and dilemmas. Our selection is undoubtedly incomplete, and it reflects our own judgment about what kinds of arguments are powerful and long lasting. Nevertheless, the selection is not wholly subjective or random. Quite simply, we chose those particular thinkers because of the quality and impact of their writings. Onuf challenges our claim that the thinkers we selected had a noticeable impact on the shape and evolution of international society. "Certainly not all of them did," Onuf argues, "at least not directly." Establishing the impact of ideas on the evolution of political practice is notoriously difficult. We agree with Onuf that some of the thinkers presented in the volume may have been more influential than others. Francisco de Vitoria and Emmerich de Vattel most readily come to mind as two thinkers who did serve as important sources and inspiration for the arguments and policies of those who came afterward. We also take Onuf's point that writers over the centuries have selectively "grabbed" from the pens of those who came before, and that changes in opinion have therefore been cumulative. Perhaps our argument in the book's introduction was not sufficiently clear in this regard. We simply reject the crude materialist argument according to which the ideas prevailing at a particular time are merely epiphenomena of particular economic, political, or technological circumstances, unaffected by the arguments of earlier generations of thinkers whom today we recognize as 'classical' or 'canonical.' In short, we work on the assumption of multiple feedback loops between the world of ideas and the world of political practice.

On questions of substance, Onuf correctly identifies our slide from talking of "princes and sovereigns" to talking of "states." The agent engaging in intervention does matter, and the question of statehood – and its relationship to the nation – is probably given too little attention in our volume. It does explicitly come up only in later chapters, notably those on Giuseppe Mazzini and John Stuart Mill, two nineteenth-century writers who thought deeply about the relationship between the state, the nation, and popular self-determination. But the time period covered in the book – early sixteenth to mid nineteenth century – was chosen for a particular purpose: while older forms of political organization continued to exist for much of this period, it was also the period during which sovereign states in the modern sense (and the corollary of statehood, a *prima facie* right to non-intervention) first emerged and became progressively consolidated in European international society.

For his part, Boucher makes the important and valid observation that our volume does not take a sufficiently 'macro' perspective, and he reminds us that the assumptions and frameworks that informed the views on intervention of the thinkers we selected simultaneously stratified the world into gradations of civilization. More generally, his point should be taken as a correction to the 'expansion' thesis in international relations, which depicts a coherent European international society that expanded, through the vehicle of imperialism, to eventually unite the whole world into a single economic, strategic, and

political system.² Following Boucher's lead, we would agree that that we should think less in terms of "who became part of international society and when," and more in terms of how various entities fit within a broader international order at different points in time. While many of the thinkers in our volume wrote about the relatively closed group of states, or 'family of nations,' that coalesced around certain institutions, rules and values, this European 'core' was only one part of a larger social order, in which there were multiple entities (some states and some not) and various kinds of interaction among them.³ Indeed, Christopher Bayly's analysis of globalization and modernity takes these connections and interactions as its starting point, challenging the notion that Europe's ideas and material resources were in the driver's seat during the era typically characterized as "European expansion."⁴ It is a fair criticism to say that our presentation of the views of European thinkers on military intervention does not help us to see the kind of multicentered world that existed prior to the twentieth century.

Finally, Jonathan Monten draws our attention to one important reason why the thinkers we selected are still worth consulting. Apart from their engagement in moral critiques or defenses of non-intervention, those writers also developed causal theories about the likely impact of intervention (on both the intervener and the 'target' society) that may still be relevant today. In particular, and in spite of their sometimes enthusiastic support for European colonialism, many of the thinkers covered in our volume expressed a healthy dose of skepticism concerning the ability of military intervention to achieve lasting political change abroad. Eighteenth-century thinkers like Adam Smith, David Hume, and Edmund Burke stressed that a society's political institutions need to reflect its deep economic and cultural conditions, and they also highlighted the corrupting effect of protracted interventions on the interveners themselves. Meanwhile, nineteenth century liberals like Mazzini and Mill emphasized that democratic self-government could not be sustained unless it was achieved by the effort and struggle of a political community. Contemporary liberal and neoconservative crusaders who selectively draw on the authority of classical thinkers to justify neo-imperialist projects of 'regime change' and 'nation-building' abroad might benefit from paying greater attention to this perhaps less well known, consequentialist aspect of early modern thinking about military intervention.

In conclusion, we would like to thank Boucher, Monten, and Onuf for their insightful, generous reviews, and for highlighting potential avenues along which the debate might be carried forward. The verve they display in debating our arguments bears testament to the richness of classical European thought about war and intervention, and to the continuing relevance of the writers we selected as a useful starting point for thinking deeply and critically about the ethics of military intervention.

² Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Clarendon Press, 1984).

³ Edward Keene, "The standard of 'civilisation,' the expansion thesis and the nineteenth-century international society space," *Millennium* 42 (3), 651-73.

⁴ Christopher Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2004).

ferences about who establishes the normative agenda in the first place... Alongside the BRICS and the non-aligned states, Russia has questioned whether the norms and legal claims cited to justify Western-led interventions have been representative of the will of the international community" (p. 209). Allison also attributed this shift to a change of thinking in Moscow, particularly from the beginning of Putin's presidency, and also to regional norm-setting by Russia to resist the use of force by the West in Georgia and Ukraine.

The book blends theoretical perspectives with case studies in a splendid manner. Moscow's thinking about military interventions since the end of the Cold War has been captured and analysed in a structured yet lucid way. However, one minor point of disagreement persists: are military interventions in the post-Cold War period really less dangerous to the present global order than earlier bipolar confrontations, as pointed out by Allison? Only time will tell. But this issue certainly is a minor one in the backdrop of the overall brilliance of the work. Allison deserves credit for bringing out a timely book on a hitherto neglected yet important issue in international politics. ■

STEFANO RECCHIA AND JENNIFER M. WELSH
(EDS.). *JUST AND UNJUST MILITARY
INTERVENTION: EUROPEAN THINKERS FROM VICTORIA
TO MILL*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. xii+306, ISBN
978-1-107-04202-5 (hbk), Price not stated.

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The recent intervention in Libya brought the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to the forefront of public and academic debate. Critics questioned the authority and intentions of the intervening coalition. Some alleged that the intervention carried out in the name of R2P was indeed driven by narrow national interests of regime change, while others argued more generally that R2P has become a tool to legitimize interventions by great powers. In such circumstances, when the legitimacy of existing military intervention doctrines is on the tight rope, by providing

an account of just and unjust military intervention from the perspective of modern European thinkers, the book aims to open the possibility of reconceptualizing and developing more acceptable doctrines of military intervention.

In order to capture the essence of theoretical debates, the book concentrates on three core areas: when, or under what circumstances, can intervention be justified? Who has the authority to intervene? What types of interventions are needed? The thinkers featured in this volume differ significantly in their treatment of these questions. On the question of justification of intervention, Vitoria rejected difference in religion, enlargement of empire, and personal interest as legitimate bases and argued that war can only be justified when “harm has been inflicted” (p. 74). Meanwhile, Wolff and Vattel believed that “shared religion gives a state special license to intervene on behalf of others” (p. 143). Suárez went a step further and accepted the use of force legitimate but only if it has been used “to ward off acts of injustice and to hold enemies in check” (p. 50). However, it was Grotius who added the “humanitarian” aspect in discourse on military intervention. He argued that preventive war can be justified against those who wage war against “imperil women” and “innocents”. Thus, he justified intervention as punishment (p. 137). Pufendorf and Vattel, on the other hand, raised the possibility of enhancing the democratic accountability of military intervention by focusing on the “consent” of those being assisted.

Pertaining to right authority, Vitoria allowed both public and private persons to wage war. However, he imposed substantial limitations on private war, which can be justified only in case of immediate danger to person and property, and should be abandoned as soon as the danger passes. Unlike Vitoria, Gentili believed that the legitimate right to wage war belongs exclusively to states, and that consequently, private individuals do not have that right (p. 103). Both advancing and departing from the idea of Gentili, Wolff rejected the idea of intervention by individual states and instead upheld that “collective intervention by the *civitas maxima* alone...[is] legitimate” (p. 144). His idea of collective intervention is shared by modern thinkers and leaders of the contemporary Global South.

Regarding the nature of intervention and use of force, views of thinkers varied significantly. Some thinkers have accepted the use of military force as legitimate, while others restrict it to “moral and political solidarity from abroad; financial and material assistance; and even the contribution of foreign volunteer militia” (p. 249). To Mazzini, states should intervene “by offering their moral, diplomatic, economic and perhaps even indirect military support...” (p. 252). It is also noticeable

that even those who support military intervention do not seem to support regime change.

Though opinions vary, however; non-intervention seems to be the rule, with exceptional intervention permissible only under specific circumstances. Some thinkers have allowed persons and individuals the right to wage war, but most of the thinkers have granted this right only to states. Though some permitted individual states to intervene, most have preferred the collective use of force. Amidst diverging opinions, what readers miss is a concluding chapter.

Despite its merits, any attempt to reconceptualize R2P or construct another doctrine of intervention to meet the challenges of today's complex world would be incomplete until it takes the Global South's view into account. The editors underline how "classical European thought" has exerted a "unique impact on our contemporary conceptual categories and normative standards" and "fundamentally shaped the parameters of legitimate intervention" (p. 7), however, they do not/fail to mention that this only became possible because of the North's domination of the international system. Now, at a time when international power equilibrium is changing, and the international system is going through a transition, the emerging powers will claim their stake in the conceptualization of any doctrine of military intervention.


Moreover, since intervention doctrines have been implemented primarily in the Global South, the inclusion of the views of the non-Western thinkers will also increase the legitimacy of such doctrines, as so far such doctrines have been considered alien. Therefore, in the light of the editors' claim that the aim of the book is "to open up to critical reflection, and with the help of the classical thinkers, to explore the possibility of reconceptualizing and reappraising contemporary problems" (p. 20), it would have been better to include some non-Western thinkers as well. In the absence of thinkers from the Global South, this volume can only be considered/regarded as representative of the European philosophical tradition, rather than a truly global or international endeavour.

Nevertheless, this volume is published at a crucial juncture when the international community as well as victims of ongoing conflicts need such doctrine. By providing a philosophical account of conceptions/theories of just and unjust military intervention during a time when R2P is gathering momentum, the book undoubtedly serves the cause of normative development in the field of military intervention. It will be a useful guide for negotiators of the new norm as well as for students and scholars. ■

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Stefano Recchia / Jennifer M. Welsh (eds.): Just and Unjust Military Intervention

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Just and Unjust Military Intervention
 European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill
 EDITED BY
 Stefano Recchia
 and Jennifer M. Welsh
 CAMBRIDGE

Die Frage nach der Legitimation militärischer Interventionen scheint angesichts der sicherheitspolitischen Brennpunkte Afghanistan, Libyen, Syrien und der jüngsten Krise auf der Krim heute aktueller denn je zu sein. Grund genug für die beiden Politikwissenschaftler Stefano Recchia, Lecturer für Internationale Beziehungen an der Cambridge University, und Jennifer M. Welsh, Professorin für Internationale Beziehungen am Europäischen Hochschulinstitut in Florenz, sich in ihrem eben erst bei Cambridge University Press erschienen Sammelband "Just and Unjust Military Intervention" intensiv mit der Thematik und den damit verbundenen kontroversen Fragen auseinanderzusetzen.

Die beiden Herausgeber wählen dabei einen interessanten methodischen Zugang, indem sie - nach ihren Angaben zum ersten Mal überhaupt [1] - Militärinterventionen im Licht der klassischen Texte europäischer politischer Philosophen und Theoretiker von der Frühen Neuzeit bis in die zweite Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts interpretieren. Neben dem Verweis auf die langfristige historische Entwicklungslinie von Interventionspraktiken begründen Recchia und Welsh diesen Schritt damit, dass die ausgewählten europäischen Denker maßgeblichen Einfluss auf die Gestalt der heutigen internationalen Gesellschaft hatten sowie moderne Schlüsselkonzepte wie Souveränität und Selbstbestimmung entscheidend prägten. Die klassischen Werke, die sich eben auch explizit mit der Legitimation und mit den Folgen militärischen Eingreifens beschäftigten, sollen für die heutigen Debatten nutzbar gemacht werden. Obwohl diese Texte, wie die Herausgeber ausdrücklich betonen, keine Blaupause für die heutige Frage nach dem Wann und Wie einer Intervention liefern, könne eine kritische Relektüre der Klassiker die heutigen Debatten dennoch stimulieren und einen wichtigen Beitrag zu neuen konzeptionellen Überlegungen leisten: "[...] our central aim is that contemporary students, scholars, and policymakers, though divided in both time and space from these earlier philosophers and jurist, can still learn a great deal from the questions raised by the classical European thinkers, the problems they highlighted, and even the problematic character of some of the solutions they offered." (19-20).

In insgesamt zwölf Kapiteln geben die vorwiegend aus dem Bereich der Politikwissenschaft stammenden Autoren einen chronologisch angeordneten, umfangreichen Einblick in die verschiedenen Positionen wichtiger politischer Philosophen zum Thema militärischer Interventionspolitik. Der Eröffnungssatz von David Trim (21-47) widmet sich zunächst den historischen Ursprüngen des Begriffs "Intervention", um dann in einem zweiten Schritt einen knappen Überblick der Interventionspraxis in der europäischen Geschichte von den Religionskriegen im 16. bis zum Eingreifen der europäischen Großmächte im Osmanischen Reich im 19. Jahrhundert zu geben. Im zweiten Kapitel wendet sich Ariel Colonomos (48-69) dann direkt den frühneuzeitlichen Denkern Francisco Suarez, Alberico Gentili, Hugo Grotius sowie Emer de Vattel zu und analysiert in einem komparativen Ansatz deren Position bezüglich des präventiven Einsatzes von Gewalt, nicht ohne gewisse Analogien zu heutigen Debatten herzustellen. Die vom spanischen Spätscholastiker Francisco de Vitoria vorgebrachte Begründung spanischer Herrschaft in Amerika als vermeintlichen Schutz der indigenen Bevölkerung vor den Praktiken von Kannibalismus und Menschenopfern steht dann im Zentrum des Beitrags von William Bain (70-95), während der anschließende Essay von Richard Tuck (96-112) noch expliziter auf erste

Rezension über:

Stefano Recchia / Jennifer M. Welsh (eds.): Just and Unjust Military Intervention. European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013, XII + 306 S., ISBN 978-1-107-04202-5, GBP 60,00
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 Mainz

Redaktionelle Betreuung:

Peter Helmberger

Empfohlene Zitierweise:

Fabian Klose: Rezension von: Stefano Recchia / Jennifer M. Welsh (eds.): Just and Unjust Military Intervention. European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013, in: sehепunkte 14 (2014), Nr. 6 [15.06.2014], URL: <http://www.sehепunkte.de/2014/06/24791.html>

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theoretische Ansätze zum Konzept der humanitären Intervention in den Arbeiten von Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes und Samuel Pufendorf eingeht. Samuel Moyn wiederum vollzieht in seinem Beitrag (113-131) einen interessanten Perspektivwechsel, indem er sich mithilfe der Ansätze von John Locke weniger auf ein Interventionsrecht als vielmehr auf das Recht zum Widerstand gegen ungerechte Militärintervention und Besatzung fokussiert. Das schwierige Verhältnis von Souveränität und Intervention problematisiert dann Jennifer Pitts (132-153), wobei sie sich hauptsächlich auf die Arbeiten des Schweizer Rechtsgelehrten Emer de Vattel stützt. Die eher allgemein gehaltenen Positionen der schottischen Aufklärer David Hume und Adam Smith (Edwin van de Haar, 154-175) fehlen im Sammelband genauso wenig wie die der französischen und deutschen Aufklärung in Gestalt von Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant und G. W. F. Hegel (Pierre Hassner, 176-195 und Andrew Hurrell, 196-218). Jennifer Welsh (219-236) verdeutlicht dann in ihrem Kapitel, dass im Zuge der Französischen Revolution ein konservativer Politiker wie Edmund Burke Intervention in erster Linie unter antirevolutionären Gesichtspunkten sah und als Instrument zum Schutz des "Commonwealth of Europe" vor der revolutionären Gefahr betrachtete. Den Abschluss des Bandes bilden schließlich zwei Aufsätze (Stefano Recchia, 237-262 und Michael Doyle, 263-287), die ihren Blick auf zwei prominente Vertreter des 19. Jahrhunderts, nämlich Giuseppe Mazzini und John Stuart Mill, richten. Obwohl beide grundsätzlich eine Position der Nichtintervention vertreten, machen sie, wie die Beiträge deutlich zeigen, Ausnahmen im Fall humanitärer Notlagen und befürworten dann ein Eingreifen von außen.

Der Sammelband bietet insgesamt ein breites Spektrum an interessanten Beiträgen, die dem Leser ein umfassendes Bild ermöglichen. Die Herausgeber sind sich dabei des Problems der historischen Kontextualisierung der klassischen Texte bewusst und thematisieren dies auch explizit in ihrer Einleitung. Allerdings sind bestimmte Analogien zwischen historischem Argument und aktueller Debatten an manchen Stellen ahistorisch und deutlich überzogen, so beispielsweise im Fall des Vergleichs der Position Elisabeths I. zur Unterstützung der französischen Protestanten im 16. Jahrhundert und der Reagan-Doktrin im Zuge des Kalten Krieges im 20. Jahrhundert (274). In den Augen des Historikers verdeckt der dominierende politikwissenschaftliche Ansatz häufig zu stark die historische Perspektive bzw. lässt dieser zu wenig Entfaltungsspielraum. Diese Kritik schmälert insgesamt gesehen jedoch keineswegs das große Verdienst des Sammelbandes, eine erste umfassende Darstellung der verschiedenen Positionen klassischer Denker in Bezug auf das Thema der Militärintervention geliefert zu haben. Entsprechend wird der Band sicherlich einen wichtigen Platz in der wachsenden Literatur dieses Forschungsfeldes finden.

Anmerkung:

[1] An dieser Stelle sei auch auf den bereits 2006 erschienenen Artikel verwiesen: Gustaaf P. Van Nifleri: Religious and Humanitarian Intervention in Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth-Century Legal Thought, in: Sovereignty and the Law of Nations (16th -18th Centuries), ed. by Randall Lesaffer / Georges Macours, Brüssel 2006, 35-60.

Fabian Klose

Book reviews

Conflict, security and defence*

Just and unjust military intervention: European thinkers from Vitoria to Mill. Edited by Stefano Recchia and Jennifer M. Welsh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2013. 317pp. Index. £60.00. ISBN 978 1 10704 202 5. Available as e-book.

If debates about humanitarian intervention fell into a brief lull in the years following 9/11, when scholars were seemingly more interested in discussing the limits of anticipatory defence and the status of the norm proscribing torture, they have recently returned with a bang. In the light of conflicts in Libya, Syria and elsewhere, there is once again a lively interest in the challenges attendant on saving strangers by means of military intervention. Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh's *Just and unjust military intervention* is a prime addition to this literature.

This edited collection, which draws together a dozen essays from leading scholars, distinguishes itself by focusing on how issues that bear on what we today call 'humanitarian intervention' were treated in early modern European political thought. Accordingly, it offers a series of finely worked discussions on how figures such as Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, Emmerich de Vattel and John Locke, among others, tackled the moral issues raised by the use of force to rescue oppressed peoples from the predations of their own government. Anyone familiar with the controversies pertaining to humanitarian intervention will of course recognize the significance of these figures. They are all, to a greater or lesser extent, cited as sources of authority that either lend weight to, or call into question, the general idea of waging war for humanitarian purposes. That is to say, they feature as intellectual backstops for contemporary arguments both for and against intervention. Yet, until this book, no dedicated treatment of these luminaries was available. This, then, is a vital source for specialists on humanitarian intervention who wish to dig a little deeper into the history of their field and the ideas that have inhabited it.

Not that the appeal of this book will be limited strictly to humanitarian intervention specialists. It should speak to just war theorists too, as well as to English School and normative International Relations theorists, and indeed anyone with an interest in international politics, the history of ideas and theories of world order. As such, scholars might find that this book works well as a companion piece to Beate Jahn's 2006 book, *Classical theory in International Relations* (also with Cambridge University Press).

Rather than address the (pleasingly sturdy and largely contextualist) methodological approach underpinning this collection, an overview of its contents may be helpful. There are, as already noted, twelve substantive entries in this volume; all are by eminent scholars and of the very highest standard. With the exception of David Trim's conceptual history of humanitarian intervention from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century (chapter one), all chapters are devoted to explicating the work of carefully selected early modern European political thinkers on humanitarian intervention. To give a flavour of this, William Bain furnishes a superb analysis of Vitoria, Richard Tuck covers Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf, Edwin van de Haar offers a lucid account of Hume and Smith; Andrew Hurrell treats Kant, and Michael Doyle holds forth with great vim on Mill. Viewed in concert, these chapters bring to light not only the historical contingency of contemporary thinking about humanitarian intervention, but also its relation to deeper traditions of western political thought.

The fact that there is no chapter devoted to the task of considering how the essays gathered here cast new light on the aforementioned deeper traditions of western political

* See also Hannes Peltonen, *International responsibility and grave humanitarian crises: collective provision for human security*; and Heather M. Roff, *Global justice, Kant and the Responsibility to Protect: a provisional duty*, both pp. 705–6.

thought—I am thinking principally of the just war tradition—is perhaps a missed opportunity. The absence of any meaningful methodological pluralism and debate is also a source of some disappointment. But these are minor quibbles that do not detract from the richness of this book. Setting a gold standard for edited collections, *Just and unjust military intervention* will surely and deservedly be seen a landmark text in its field.


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Genocide and International Relations: changing patterns in the transitions of the late modern world. By **Martin Shaw**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2013. 238pp. Index. Pb.: £19.99. ISBN 978 0 52112 517 8. Available as e-book.

Should one read the latest of Martin Shaw’s three books on genocide? Clearly. It is an important contribution to the existing literature with a special focus on how major shifts in the twentieth-century international system affected the nature, objectives, locations and mechanisms of genocidal violence. Though good at describing and re-analysing the existing literature on case-studies and summarizing much of the comparative literature that evolved post-1990, one wishes the author was more thorough in reading the comparative literature on civil wars, especially ethnic conflict, and familiarizing himself with genocide risk assessments and the early warning work that emerged during the late 1980s. This lack of familiarity leads to unwarranted generalizations and clear misses about what does and does not exist in what he calls the ‘narrow comparative approach’.

Shaw’s definition of genocidal action is broad: ‘armed power organizations treat civilian and social groups as enemies and aim to destroy their real or putative social power, by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom they regard as members of the groups’ (p. 5). True enough—anti-population violence, genocidal violence and mass atrocities can be aspects of ethnic or civil war. Civilians do get killed during war, which of course begs the question: when do we call something a genocide, a war crime or the unintended or unfortunate by-product of other forms of conflict? Though the debate raged during the 1980s for comparative genocide scholars, especially after Holocaust scholars began to take note, we of the earlier generation thought that we dealt effectively with the issues that are raised today. One classic example is the Cambodian genocide, which in earlier work was identified as an auto-genocide. In Shaw’s and our judgement this makes little sense; why then not call it a politicide, a widely used term? Furthermore, for empiricists and others singling out some genocides as mega-genocides made little sense. Comparison is of essence to explanation. Numbers, location, length and time matter when accounting for the victims, but what matters most is to establish intent as the driver that leads to the death of any number of people belonging to some kind of group. Of course most of us agree with Shaw that states are not the only genocidaires.

One of Shaw’s recurring criticisms of comparative genocide studies is that they ignore the changing international conditions that reshaped genocidal violence, including the post-1945 wave of decolonization, international support or protection from neighbouring countries or superpower involvement. In 1987, I published a chapter on ‘The etiology of genocides’ (in I. Walliman and M. Dobkowski, eds, *Genocide and the modern age*, Greenwood), developing and enhancing the concept of upheaval, which introduced its international components, namely postwar, post-colonial, irredentist movements that lend support, and what I have called post-imperial genocides. In other works bipolarity is mentioned as having provided a modicum of stability in the core but not in the periphery, often leading to proxy wars, coups and other forms of local rebellion, possibly including genocide. Comparative



Stefano Recchia and Jennifer M. Welsh, eds. Just and Unjust Military Intervention: European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

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Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh have brought together in this tome a number of authors intending to essentially see what can be learnt from early modern political philosophers about just war and humanitarian intervention. They attempt to have all works in the volume discuss three themes and answer two essential questions. The first theme centers on the issues concerning *jus ad bellum* (the legitimate reasons for going to war). In this, the editors identify the main question of when intervention is permissible.

They say that the work of early modern philosophers broadly are applicable to today's environment, since while the context may have changed, those philosophers still address important issues such as whether the existence of a dictatorial regime is enough to intervene, or whether there must be proof of wrongdoing or genocide in order to do so. While these appear to be very modern issues, and are termed in modern ways, they are questions thinkers have struggled with since the Roman period, as shown in Richard Tuck's article "Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf on Humanitarian Intervention."

Secondly, there is the issue of *jus in bello* (the laws in place once war has begun), summed up by Recchia and Welsh as basically asking what kind of military action or level of force is acceptable in a humanitarian intervention. As many of the articles in the collection point out, there was no concept of regime change in the early modern period where humanitarian interventions were concerned. Largely, the goal was simply to change the behavior of a regime in respect to a certain minority. Different philosophers tied this to whether the consequences of war, especially those unseen, were worth the good done in the intervention.

Finally, the third theme that the editors sought to have addressed was about on whose authority is there determined to be a "rightness" for intervention. While the specificity of the first two questions require the philosophers analyzed to answer these questions relatively directly, the "rightness" factor revolves around the idea of whether there is an objective truth, objective right, or objective authority.

There are two questions that the editors implored the authors to answer, and in this they all succeed. The first is "What is a legitimate basis for intervention?" and the second is "What is the likely impact of intervention and what are the associated risks?" (8).

While issues such as an objective truth and whether the consequences of intervention are worth the lives saved, something the world is currently debating for both Iraq and Libya, are very much applicable to any temporal period, the editors and most of the authors, seek to address the dangers of "presentism." As the editors note, there is a movement that fundamentally advises against trying to place past concepts of justice and right into today's world. While keeping in mind and acknowledging that there is a danger in trying to imprint yesterday's values on today, and vice versa, the

editors point out that there are lessons to be learned and epistemic value in studying past philosophical works, especially influential ones, for their intentions. By studying these, you can tease out broader lessons, and use their logic in solving modern day problems; just because the context was different does not mean that their logic was unsound. That being said, few of the authors tackle this issue directly, instead choosing to outline the arguments and analyze them for what they may or may not mean concerning just war and humanitarian intervention. Regardless, as the editors claim, the two questions asked of the contributors are, essentially, timeless.

There are a number of things to draw attention to in this collection. First, a problem that the editors may face is one of ethnocentrism, as they focus solely on western authors. However, as the international system, with regard to both laws and politics, is based on the Westphalian system (around which the philosophers presented were living in and debated about) and a product of Western European civilization, it is for the most part sound to focus upon western authors. Secondly, an issue which all of the contributors, and the editors, fail to address is that the examples given (save one on the Spanish “intervention” in the new world to “protect” against practices such as human sacrifice and cannibalism), are all performed by England and by English politicians of all stripes, be they monarch or Lord Protector. English intervention in Savoy and the Netherlands are the rare examples of purely humanitarian intervention given during the time period in question. Perhaps some analysis as to why this is the case would be helpful. But this is a small issue and is perhaps best left to a study on its own.

All in all, the book will prove to be an excellent resource for those looking to shore up their epistemological understanding and arguments concerning just war and humanitarian intervention. At the same time, it reminds us all that while sometimes it seems that the only moral option is to intervene, people 500 years ago recognized that to do so could create a situation, either war or something that follows a war, that is an even greater moral and ethical sin. In a world of failed and failing states, where humanitarian intervention seems to be the only “right” option, it is wise to remember that there are many aspects that need to be considered before action is taken.

MARCH 4, 2014 | *Edmund Burke, Hegel, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Military Intervention, Monroe Doctrine, Neoconservatism, Pierre Hassner, Truman Doctrine, Vattel, Woodrow Wilson*

The Problem of Military Intervention


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Much of American military and diplomatic history can be told in terms of military intervention and counter intervention, as well as debates about the justice and prudence of using force this way. One of the fundamental purposes of the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 was to persuade third parties, like France, Spain, and the Netherlands, to intervene in the conflict against Great Britain. Since France supplied upwards of 90% of the arms and ammunition the Americans used and provided not only a navy but also an army larger than the force of Continental soldiers George Washington brought to the decisive Franco-American victory at Yorktown, the value of foreign intervention to American independence, and the liberty it secures, cannot be overstated.

The Monroe Doctrine established counter intervention against European intervention in the Western Hemisphere as a fundamental tenet of American foreign policy. Extending that principle to the rest of the world was perhaps the most ambitious goal of Americans in the First and Second World Wars, in the League of Nations and the United Nations, in the Truman Doctrine, in Korea (which eventually provoked Chinese counter intervention), in Vietnam, in the Reagan Doctrine, and in Kuwait in 1991. So Americans can never say never to military intervention, especially when justified as counter intervention, though they would be wise to profit from the important limits set to it by the contributors to this volume.

The editors deserve high praise for an impressive, original work of scholarship. Although justifications for military intervention frequently appeal to the European thinkers the contributors investigated, this is the first book to take a comprehensive look at all of them. Moreover, their volume does not skim the surface by examining their important subject merely in light of the usual suspects. The contributors begin even before the beginning of the modern European state system in the sixteenth century and end with the late nineteenth century, when most of the original European



terms of the continuing debate over the justice of military intervention became paradigmatic for our own age – and eventually, for the world. Yes, careful scholars do discuss what Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Guiseppe Mazzini, and John Stuart Mill had to contribute, implicitly or explicitly, to our contemporary debates, but no less careful scholars also explore the byways to the modern age in just war theory, the law of nations, and European colonization of the New World in the lesser known works of Francesco Suarez, Alberico Gentili, Hugo Grotius, Emerich de Vattel, Francisco de Vitoria, and Samuel Pufendorf. Each of the contributors makes an effort to situate these thinkers in their historical circumstances without making them mere prisoners of history. Each of these thinkers contributes something to what one of the contributors, Pierre Hassner, considered a necessary and fruitful dialogue regarding modern principles often in deep tension with each other, but alas, not a dialogue that lends itself easily to categorical conclusions.

As Jennifer Pitts reveals in her discussion of Vattel, the norm of nonintervention, still the default position of the modern age, did not happen merely as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia, which actually codified rights of intervention to protect religious minorities. Nonetheless, it served as an ideal type, a standard for Vattel and most who came after him of respecting human dignity by respecting the rights of different communities to work out their destinies free from foreign interference. Prior to that norm, just war theory also served as a partial check on intervention. For Augustine and his followers, war was an evil. It could be justified only as an act of defense against direct attack. As the Spanish expanded into the New World, however, some justified intervention, or disguised conquest, in humanitarian terms, like preventing cannibalism and converting heathens.

As William Bain reveals, however, these military interventions produced moral and political objections, conscientious interventions, if you will, with Vitoria famously arguing for armed intervention to protect innocent victims of conquest. As Richard Tuck observes, however, by the seventeenth century, the taste for both intervention and counter intervention appears to have cooled. Grotius famously justified war to punish sovereigns who abused their citizens, but perhaps because of his keen understanding of Thucydides and the famous failed Athenian expedition to Sicily especially; Hobbes treated war in general, and voluntary interventions in particular, as a gamble unlikely to achieve its objectives but likely to squander precious resources. Pufendorf was skeptical of the paternalism latent in many arguments for intervention, so he was reluctant to countenance it on behalf of strangers, unless they specifically requested it.

True to form, John Locke, as Samuel Moyn explains, was concerned with the problem of right authority, especially when both sides consider themselves in the right, as they usually do, and with resistance to intervention. “Who shall be judge?” Locke famously asked. His response: The people shall be judge, thus justifying a right of resistance to foreign intervention invoked in anti-colonial revolutions ever since. Edwin van de Haar, offers a sober assessment of Hume’s and Smith’s usually common stance. Their priority was liberty, at home especially, but the security of liberty at home depended on the international environment, especially the norm of non-intervention and the balance of power. So they were perhaps most strongly opposed to intervention, lest it disturb the international order on which the domestic order depends. Although it is conceivable they might have supported intervention to punish foreign oppressors, especially if the act also served a vital national interest, they tended to fear the domestic consequences of intervention abroad. Governing others by force abroad might breed habits, tastes, and sympathies inimical to freedom at home.

As Pierre Hassner shows, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel were all over the map. Because of his many paradoxes, one cannot tell whether Rousseau, the champion of compassion, would come down on the side of humanitarian intervention, or Rousseau, the champion of self-sufficient autonomous republics, would have been deeply suspicious of self-appointed liberators. Kant is categorical, as usual, in denouncing foreign intervention, but ironically, justifies it against an unjust enemy to change its constitution. Not quite true, says Andrew Hurrell, because Kant was referring to states, like France under Napoleon perhaps, that were first and foremost internationally aggressive. Regime change for Kant was thus an unfortunate necessity in a particular case, not a license for self-righteous crusades. Indeed for Hurrell, Kant’s positions have been stretched beyond all recognition to justify the interventionist positions of contemporary interpreters. He is best understood as an international pluralist, focused on the law of nations, not a Wilsonian, though one might claim that Hegel was the most bellicose and unambiguously interventionist of all these thinkers, a prototype of the neoconservative who would bring civilization and the rule of law to “barbarous peoples” by means of force in the name of the triumph of the World Spirit.

Jennifer Welsh explores an underlying unity to Edmund Burke's apparent inconsistencies. He was first and foremost a statesman, a man of prudence, and deeply concerned with the moral health of his country and his culture. Fearing that oppressing Americans, who were fellow Englishmen of a different stripe, would teach Englishmen in England to oppress each other, he pled for conciliation, not war with the American colonies. Fearing that the French Revolution would overthrow the common culture of Europe, and introduce an age of fanatical "armed doctrines," he also pled to kill the viper in its crib with preventive war.

In contrast, Giuseppe Mazzini, often caricatured as a proto-Wilsonian or Che Guevara of foreign interventions on behalf of democratic government, turns out, in the hands Stefano Recchia, to be a moral realist. He embraced the right of each people to establish its own form of government and he championed democratic government above all, but he opposed regime change in support of democratic government through direct military intervention, doubting that the change would be genuine or could be lasting once the foreign force was withdrawn, a doubt shared by many veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

Michael Doyle gets the last word in the volume with a discussion of Mill's principled aversion to exporting democracy by force and Mill's prudential reasons to make exceptions to or override that principle. For example, for Mill, the liberal victor, following a successful war against a foreign despot, may impose regime change to remove a standing menace to peace. Mill was probably thinking of Napoleon, but the examples of regime change in Germany and Japan after the Second World War also come to mind.

The initial theme of this volume was the justice or injustice of foreign military intervention, but as it develops, prudence becomes a no less important issue. Even if humanitarian intervention is justified under the United Nations' standard of the "right to protect," as some might say regarding Syria today, what good would it do? What would it cost? Might Europeans and the United States, the only powers able and possibly willing to undertake this task, leap from the frying pan into the fire by enabling Al Qaeda to replace the Assad regime? If Hume and Smith were right to regard the balance of power as both the guarantor of the international order and the foundation of domestic orders able to secure liberty, might the opportunity cost of humanitarian intervention, and regime change in the manner of 2003 in Iraq, prove a distraction from the greatest killer and foremost threat to freedom of the past hundred years: war among great powers? If preventing such war is the greatest strategic priority of humanity for the twenty-first century, avoiding distractions would have to be its first, most necessary corollary.

Political authorities, however, as shown at the beginning of Shakespeare's *Henry V*, prove remarkably adept at manipulating the principles, e.g., Sallic law, that might justify foreign military adventures to suit their interests and ambitions. Prince Hal, the humanitarian, loved France so much that he told Kate, his queen to be, that he would not part with an inch of it. Thus, skepticism about the principles used to invoke intervention, whether as means by which authorities dupe others or themselves, is always prudent. The conundrums of foreign military intervention are so great that we need help to preserve the kind of moral health Burke championed in his understanding of prudence. The editors and the contributors of this volume deserve nothing but gratitude for using the past and its most celebrated minds in Europe to help us think through the challenges military intervention poses for our own time.

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