

International and European Security

2012-2013

Lectures: Mondays, 9-10am, room SG1

Seminar Group A: Mondays, 1-2.30pm, room S1

Seminar Group B: Tuesdays, 4.00-5.30pm, room S3

Dr. Geoffrey Edwards and Dr. Stefano Recchia

Course Description:

This course is designed to provide students with a foundation in contemporary international security studies. To that end, the first part of the course deals in-depth with some of the main concepts, theories, and issues in international security. Central questions include: What are the causes of war and the conditions of peace? Can military intervention be a cause for good in the world? How have state failure, ethnic conflict, and transnational terrorism changed the nature of international politics? The second part of the course focuses specifically on the European Union (EU) as an emerging actor in the field of international security. Special attention will be given to how the EU, through its new institutional architecture, has responded to some of the challenges identified in the first part of the course. Throughout the year, we will apply different theories to select historical and contemporary cases in order to illustrate how theory can help us make sense of complex, real-world events. Students with no prior background in international relations theory will benefit from reading one of the following two books as a general introduction to the course: Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (Norton, 1997); or Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, 4th edition (Palgrave, 2009).

Course Materials:

Students are encouraged to purchase the following textbook for this course, given that we will be reading substantial portions of it:

- Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds., *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

Note on readings: Readings marked with ** are required (students should read ALL of them); readings marked with * are recommended (students should read two or three of them for each session). The required and recommended readings can be downloaded from the CamTools course website (except those to be found in the textbook). The other readings are intended as further background and guidance for students with a specific interest in the topic, and for those who are preparing seminar presentations and/or writing their MPhil thesis on a related subject.

Seminars: Beginning on 15 October, there will be weekly seminar sections (on Mon and Tue). Participation in one of the seminar sections is required, and students should come to their section prepared to discuss the required and recommended readings for that week. Each student will further have to contribute to a group presentation in the course of the year (details TBA).

Course Schedule and Readings:

Michaelmas Term (lectures by Dr. Stefano Recchia)

5 October, 2012

General introduction: Presentation of the syllabus, goals, and requirements.

Lecture One (8 October, 2012): What is Security and Why should we study it?

(Overview of concepts and issues: national security, human security, securitization.)

*Richard Betts, "From Cold War to Hot Peace," in his *American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security* (Columbia UP, 2012), pp. 3-18. [Traditional realist view.]

** Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," in his *Discord and Collaboration* (Johns Hopkins UP, 1962). [Critiques the realist view of national security].

* Steve Smith, "The Contested Concept of Security," in Ken Booth, ed., *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (Lynne Rienner, 2005), pp. 27-62. [Good overview & discussion].

Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge UP, 2009), pp. 8-20, 30-38, 39-65. [Tracks and explains historical evolution of the subfield.]

David A. Baldwin, "The concept of security," *Review of International Studies* 23: 5 (1997), pp. 5-26. [Seeks to clarify the concept by narrowing it down].

Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (Columbia UP, 1996) pp. 1-32.

** Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security* 26:2 (2001) 87-102. [A spirited critique of the concept.]

*S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, *Human Security and the UN* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2006), esp. the introduction. [Examines the UN's role in promoting the concept].

Nicholas Thomas and William T. Tow, "The Utility of Human Security," *Security Dialogue* 33:2 (2002), pp. 177-192. [Defends the concept].

**Barry Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner, 1998), esp. chapters 1, 2. [The locus classicus for "securitization."]

*Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European Journal of International Relations* 14:4 (2008), pp. 563-587. [The best of the critiques].

Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 47:4 (2003), pp. 511-532.

*Michael E. Brown, "New Global Dangers," in *Crocker et al. Reader* [Good overview of the changing security landscape and resulting challenges for policy.]

Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Environmental Change, Security, and Conflict," in *Crocker et al. Reader* [Introduces and discusses the concept of "environmental security"]

TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

Lecture Two (15 October): The Causes of Inter-State War

(Three levels of analysis: the individual, domestic politics, the international system.)

The level-of-analysis framework:

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (Columbia UP, 1959), esp. Chap. 1.

Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton UP, 1976), Chap. 1.

** J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14:1 (1961), pp. 77-92.

Jack Levy, "The causes of war and the conditions of peace," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1 (1998), pp.139-165. [Excellent overview of the literature.]

The individual:

**Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, "Why War? The Einstein-Freud Correspondence (1931-32)," available online: [click here](#).

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, Chap. 2.

*Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18:4 (Spring 1988), pp. 675-700. Alternatively, read chapter 3 of his *Perception and Misperception*. [War is more likely when statesmen misperceive each others' intentions and capabilities.]

John Garnett, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," in John Baylis et al, eds., *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, third ed. (Oxford UP, 2010), pp. 19-42.

Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25:4 (Spring 2001), pp. 107-146. [Explains when and how individual leaders can shape international political outcomes.]

The domestic level:

*V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in Richard K Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*, 4th edition (Pearson, 2012). [Capitalist societies are expansionist.]

*Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Cornell UP, 1993), chapters 1-2. [War and imperial expansion as the result of domestic logrolling among groups with parochial interests.]

Stephen Walt, *Revolution and War* (Cornell UP, 1997), Chap. 2. [Domestic revolution as a cause of interstate war.]

** Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Turbulent Transitions: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War," in *Crocker et al. Reader* [Transitions to democracy can be rocky.]

Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18:4 (Spring, 1988), pp. 653-673. [A good overview of what we know.]

Stephen van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18:4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39. [Explains when and how nationalism can lead to war.]

The international system:

*Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18:4 (Spring 1988), pp. 615-628. [Wars happen because there is no common authority to prevent them.]

John J. Mearseimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Norton, 2001), pp. 1-55. [Great powers naturally strive for hegemony. Classic statement of offensive realism.]

*Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge UP, 1981), chap. 5, pp. 186-210. [The rise of new powers heightens the risk of major war.]

*Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (Macmillan 1977; 4th edition Palgrave Macmillan 2012), Chap. 3, 8. [War as an institution of international society.]

**Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30:2 (1978), 167-214. [Explains how efforts to increase one's own security can actually decrease it, and discusses possible ways out of the dilemma.]

Steven Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security* 22:4 (Spring, 1998), pp. 5-43 [War is more likely when conquest is easy, or thought to be easy.]

James D. Fearon, "Rationalist explanations for war," *International Organization* 49:3 (1995), pp. 379-414. [Explains from a rationalist framework why states may not be able to resolve their conflicts through peaceful diplomacy.]

John Vasquez, and Christopher S. Leskiw, "The Origins and War Proneness of Interstate Rivalries," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001), pp. 295-316. [States with territorial disputes are likely to become "enduring rivals," significantly increasing the probability of war.]

*Jack S. Levy, "International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War," in *Crocker et al. Reader* [Good overview of the literature.]

*Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49. [Future wars will take place along cultural and civilizational fault lines.]

Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton UP, 1986), pp. 510-526. [Leaders' belief in offense dominance as a cause of WWI].

Lecture Three (22 October): The Conditions of Peace

(The balance of power; democracy and interdependence; institutions; changing norms.)

The balance of power vs. hegemony/unipolarity:

William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24:1 (1999), pp. 5-41. [Why the current unipolar system is here to stay.]

*Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy* 54 (Spring 1984), pp. 64-82. [American hegemony explains the postwar peace in Europe.]

* William Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," *World Politics* 61: 1 (2009), pp. 28–57 [Unipolarity reduces status competition, hence contributes to peace.]

Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* 93:3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909. Alternatively, read chaps. 6, 8 of his *Theory of International Politics* (McGraw-Hill, 1979; second edition, Waveland Pr. Inc., 2010). [Why bipolar systems are most stable.]

Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Johns Hopkins UP, 1962), chaps. 8, 9.

**Michael W. Doyle, "Balancing Power Classically: An Alternative to Collective Security?" in George W. Downs, ed., *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War* (University of Michigan Press, 1994). Alternatively, read Chap. 5 of Doyle's *Ways of War and Peace*.

Nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction:

Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton UP, 1986), pp. 735-778.

*Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, chapter 2. [Discusses the challenges of "extended deterrence"—i.e., how to deter an attack on your allies.]

John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* 10:4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142. [Nuclear deterrence and bipolarity largely explain why the Cold War has not become "hot."]

*Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: IISS, 1981).

*Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, "A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?" *Journal of International Affairs*, 60:2 (2007), 135-150. [Nuclear proliferation: for and against.]

John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security* 13:2 (Fall 1988), pp. 55-79. [Nuclear weapons—really?]

Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment," *International Security* 13:2 (Fall 1988), pp. 80-90. [A realist skeptic's reply to Mueller.]

Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *International Organization* 53:3 (1999), pp. 433-468. [Socially constructed norms, rather than deterrence, explain why nuclear weapons have not been used.]

Democracy and economic interdependence:

*Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H.Reiss, ed., *Kant’s Political Writings* (Cambridge UP, 1991). [Foundational text of liberal internationalism; read it if you have not done so before.]

**Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Part I, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12: 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 205-235.

Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001), chaps. 1, 3. [Tests the hypothesis.]

John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” *International Security* 19:2 (1994), pp.87-125. [What matters is whether states perceive each other as liberal democracies.]

Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Common Interests or Common Polities?” *Journal of Politics* 59: 2 (1997), pp. 393-417. [Does democracy explain the peace among democracies?].

*Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” *American Political Science Review* 97:4 (2003), pp. 585-602.

*Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 4th edition (Pearson, 2012), chap. 2, pp. 19-31. [Peace as the result of complex interdependence.]

Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” *American Journal of Political Science* 51:1 (2007), pp. 166-191. [Capital market integration as a cause of peace.]

Katherine Barbieri, *The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?* (University of Michigan Press, 2002), Intro and Chap. 3. [Influential critique of the liberal peace hypothesis.]

International organizations (IOs):

**Inis L. Claude, “Collective Security as an Approach to Peace,” in Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares* (New York, Random House, 1962), pp. 245-311.

Dan Lindley, *Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes* (Princeton UP, 2007), pp. 1-17. [Explains how IOs promote peace by increasing information.]

*John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19 (3), 1995, pp. 5-49 [International institutions are irrelevant.]

*Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” *International Security* 20: 1 (1995), pp. 39-51. [Rebuttal to Mearsheimer-institutions matter a great deal.]

Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, “The United Nations and Conflict Management: Relevant or Irrelevant?” in *Crocker et al. Reader*

Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom, “Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?” *World Politics* 57:1 (2004), pp. 1-38. [The type of IO matters.]

Andreas Hasenclever and Brigitte Weiffen, “International institutions are the key: a new perspective on the democratic peace,” *Review of International Studies* 32 (2006), pp. 563-585.

John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes,” *International Organization* 52:3 (1998), pp.441–467. [Large-N data in support of the argument that IOs promote peace.]

Changing norms and expectations:

Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.

**Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

John Mueller, "The Obsolescence of Major War," *Security Dialogue* 21:3 (1990), pp. 321-328. [Major war is unlikely because we have come to view it as repulsive and uncivilized.]

*Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force," *International Organization* 55:2 (2001), pp. 215-250.

*Robert L. Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace," *American Political Science Review* 91:1 (2002), pp. 1-14. [The world's most developed states have formed a security community, which makes war among its members unthinkable.]

Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends* (Princeton UP, 2010), Chapters 1, 2. [Explains how sustained diplomatic engagement can turn rivals into friends.]

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge UP, 1998), Chapters 1-2. [Classic social constructivist conceptualization of security communities].

Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice* (Cambridge UP, 2010), pp. 1-51. [Lasting security communities emerge when peace becomes a "social fact."]

Jack L. Snyder, "Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War," *International Organization* 56:1 (2002) 7-45. [A sophisticated realist challenge to culturalist arguments.]

Lecture Four (29 October): Coercive Diplomacy and Humanitarian Intervention

(Compellence as an instrument of statecraft; the ethics, law, and politics of humanitarian intervention; the Responsibility to Protect.)

Compellence:

*Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale UP, 1966) esp. "The Diplomacy of Violence," pp. 1-34.

**Robert J. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy," in *Crocker et al. Reader* [Explains why "forceful persuasion short of all-out war" is exceedingly difficult].

*Alexander L. George, "Coercive Diplomacy," in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force*, seventh ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), pp. 72-78.

Ruth Wedgwood, "War and Law: The Dilemmas of International Law and Coercive Enforcement," in *Crocker Reader* [Good discussion of the limits and potential of the contemporary international legal framework regulating the use of force.]

Daniel Byman and Andrew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion* (Cambridge UP, 2002), Chapters 1, 3, 6, 7.

Lawrence Freedman, "Using Force for Peace in the Age of Terror," in *Crocker Reader* [What humanitarian interventions of the 1990s have in common with the 'war against terror.']

Humanitarian intervention:

D.J.B. Trim and Brendan Simms, "Towards a History of Humanitarian Intervention," in Simms and Trim, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention: A History* (Cambridge UP, 2011). [Humanitarian intervention is a much less recent a phenomenon than commonly assumed.]

*Martha Finnemore, "Changing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention* (Cornell UP, 2003). [How changing norms regulate and shape humanitarian intervention.]

Taylor Seybolt, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure* (Oxford UP, 2007), esp. Chaps. 1, 8. [Explains when humanitarian interventions are most likely to succeed at saving lives.]

Arguments for humanitarian intervention:

*Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Rescue," *Social Research* 62:1 (Spring 1995), pp. 53-66. [Humanitarian intervention OK to stop acts that "shock the moral conscience of mankind."]

**Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, "The Responsibility to Protect," *Foreign Affairs*, 81: 6 (November/December 2002), pp. 99-110.

*Bruce W. Jentleson, "Yet Again: Humanitarian Intervention and the Challenges of 'Never Again,'" in Crocker et al. *Reader* [Good introduction to main issues and challenges.]

Fernando Tesón, "The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention," in J.L.Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge UP, 2003). [Passionate defense of humanitarian intervention from a liberal cosmopolitan standpoint.]

Stanley Hoffmann, "The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention," *Survival* 37:4 (Winter 1995), pp. 29-51. [Cautious endorsement of humanitarian intervention by an 'old-school' liberal internationalist.]

*Tom Farer, "A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention," in Lori Fisler Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). [Emphasizes and explains the importance of multilateral authorization and oversight.]

Richard Tuck, "Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf on Humanitarian Intervention," in Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh, eds., *European Classics on Military Intervention* (Cambridge UP, 2013). [Good review and discussion of classical thinking on humanitarian intervention.]

Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All* (Brookings Institution Press, 2009), Chaps. 2, 6.

Alex Bellamy, "The UN Security Council and the Use of Force," in his *Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect* (Routledge, 2011), pp. 162-195.

Michael O'Hanlon, "Expanding Global Military Capacity to Save Lives with Force," in Crocker et al. *Reader* [How to establish a global intervention force.]

*Robert A. Pape, "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention," *International Security* 37: 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 41-80. [Outsiders should intervene only when they have a workable strategy to establish long-term security.]

Arguments against humanitarian intervention:

**Jennifer Welsh, “Taking consequences seriously: objections to humanitarian intervention,” in J. Welsh, ed., *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations* (Oxford UP, 2004), pp. 52-70. [Good overview and discussion of arguments against humanitarian intervention.]

Richard K. Betts, “Confused Interventions,” in his *American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security* (Columbia UP, 2012), pp. 50-80. [If you choose to intervene, avoid half-measures and support one side decisively. Skeptical realist analysis.]

Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” *Foreign Affairs* 75:1 (Jan./Feb. 1996), pp. 16-32. [Why ideological interventions aimed at “doing good” are doomed to fail.]

**Alan J. Kuperman, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (2008), pp. 49–80. [How half-hearted interventions can make matters worse.]

*Edward Luttwak, “Give war a chance,” *Foreign Affairs* 78:4 (July-August 1999), pp. 36-44. [Forget about external intervention—just let them fight it out.]

David Chandler, “The responsibility to protect? Imposing the Liberal Peace,” *International Peacekeeping* 11:1 (2004), pp. 59-81. [Humanitarian intervention as a neo-imperial practice.]

Case study: Libya

*Michael Walzer, “The Case Against Our Attack on Libya,” *The New Republic*, March 20, 2011. [Libya didn’t cross the threshold for humanitarian intervention.]

Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, “Principles, Politics, and Prudence: Libya, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Use of Military Force,” *Global Governance* 18:3 (Summer 2012), pp. 273-297.

*Jennifer Welsh, “Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 25:3 (Fall 2011), pp. 255–262.

Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 25:3 (Fall 2011), pp. 279-285.

Erica Borghard and Costantino Pischedda, “Allies and Airpower in Libya,” *Parameters* (Spring 2012), pp. 63-74. [Can NATO airpower effectively support local insurgents?]

“NEW” SECURITY ISSUES

Lecture Five (5 November): Ethnic Conflict, State Failure, and Civil War

(The causes of war within states: nationalism, ruthless elites, fear & resentment, economics, weak institutions. Understanding state failure and its implications.)

Ethnic conflict and civil war:

*Ted Robert Gurr, “Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in the Twenty-First Century,” in *Crocker Reader*. [Good overview of theories and evidence.]

Steven Van Evera and Daniel Byman, “Why they fight: hypotheses on the causes of contemporary deadly conflict,” *Security Studies* 7:3 (1998), pp.1-50.

Connor Cruise O’Brien, “The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism’s Primordial Roots,” *Foreign Affairs*, 72: 5 (November/Dec. 1993), pp. 142-149. [Nationalism has ancient roots.]

**M. E. Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflicts,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 1-31. [Ruthless elites cause violent ethnic conflict.]

Roger D. Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence* (Cambridge UP, 2002), pp. 17-84. [Popular emotions and collective resentment as the source of ethnic violence.]

**Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma,” in Jack Snyder and Barbara Walter, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia UP, 1999).

James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97:1(2003), pp.75-90.[State weakness and rough terrain make civil war likely.]

*Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” in *Crocker Reader*.

Stathis Kalyvas, “The Changing Character of Civil Wars, 1800-2009,” in Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, eds., *The Changing Character of War* (Oxford UP, 2011).

State Failure:

**Robert Rotberg, “The Challenge of Weak, Failing and Collapsed States,” in *Crocker Reader*.

*Mahmood Mamdani, “Historicizing Power and Responses to Power: Indirect Rule and Its Reform,” *Social Research* 66:3 (Fall 1999), pp. 859-886. [How the colonial legacy helps us understand today’s reality of weak and ethnically divided states in Africa.]

Mohammed Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” in *Crocker Reader*.

**Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist,” *World Politics* 35:1 (1982), pp.1-24. [Explains how contemporary sovereignty norms allow weak states to survive.]

Halvard Buhaug, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ole Magnus Theisen, “Implications of Climate Change for Armed Conflict,” Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008.

*Jeffrey Herbst, “Let them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice,” in Robert Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail* (Princeton UP, 2003). [Proposes ‘decertification’ of failed states.]

Lecture Six (12 November): Terrorism and Counterterrorism

(Causes of terrorism; suicide terrorism; strategies of counterterrorism; targeted killing.)

Terrorism – understanding the causes:

**Martha Crenshaw, “Terrorism and Global Security” in *Crocker et al. Reader*.

**Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), chaps. 1-2, pp. 19-86. [Suicide terrorism as a form of resistance to foreign military occupation.]

Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” *International Security* 31:1 (Summer 2006), pp. 49-79.

*Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, rev. and expanded ed. (Columbia UP, 2006), pp. 1-45. [Good conceptual and historical overview.]

Ayse Zarakol, “What makes terrorism modern? Terrorism, legitimacy, and the international system,” *Review of International Studies* 37:5 (2011), pp. 2311-2336. [Identifies two types of terrorism, system-affirming and system-threatening, and discusses their implications].

James D. Kiras, “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency,” in John Baylis et al, eds., *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, third ed. (Oxford UP, 2010), pp. 185-207.

Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Motives and Counterterrorist Strategy,” *International Security* 32:4 (Spring 2008), pp. 78-105. [Terrorists seek social solidarity.]

James A. Piazza, “Incubators of Terror? Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism,” *International Studies Quarterly* 52:3 (2008), pp. 469-488. [Unsurprisingly, yes.]

Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17:4 (Fall 2003), pp. 119–144. [Poverty does not cause terrorism.]

Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” *American Economic Review*, 96:2 (2006), pp.50–56. [Political regime instability makes terrorism likely.]

Michael C. Horowitz, “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism,” *International Organization* 64:1 (Winter 2010), pp. 33-64. [Why do certain groups adopt suicide bombing, while others don't?]

Debating counterterrorism strategies:

*Paul R. Pillar, “Dealing with Terrorists,” in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force*, seventh ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), pp. 501-508.

**John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11,” *International Security* 37: 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81-110. [Provocative piece suggesting the cure might be worse than the disease.]

Arjun Chowdhury and Ronald R. Krebs, “Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy, Political Networks, and Counterterrorism,” *Security Studies* 18:3 (July 2009), pp. 371-399. [Discusses how moderates can be strengthened in terrorism-prone societies.]

Daniel Byman, *Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad* (Wiley, 2008). [Advocates a multi-pronged strategy. Focus on U.S. vs. Al-Qaeda.]

*Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” *International Security* 31:1 (2006) 7-48. [No single strategy will work, but we can learn a lot by studying how previous terrorist organizations have ended.]

Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, eds., *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past* (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007) esp. Chap. 16. [Force alone is unlikely to succeed.]

Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad,” *The National Interest*, May-June 2010, pp. 17-28. [The U.S. has been too narrowly focused on a “kill or capture” approach targeting individuals.]

William B. Messmer and Carlos L. Yordan, “A Partnership to Counter International Terrorism: The UN Security Council and the UN Member States,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34:11 (2011), pp. 843-861. [Counterterrorism cooperation at the UN has been reasonably effective.]

The politics and ethics of targeted killing:

*Michael Walzer, “Terrorism: A critique of excuses” [Terrorism cannot be excused, not even as a last resort]; and “After 9/11: Five Questions about terrorism,” [Why killing terrorist leaders is justified]. In: M. Walzer, *Arguing About War* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2004).

*David Luban, “What Would Augustine Do? The President, Drones, and Just War Theory,” *The Boston Review*, June 6, 2012. [A spirited discussion of the principal moral issues.]

**Stephanie Carvin, “The Trouble with Targeted Killing,” *Security Studies* 21:3 (Fall 2012), pp. 529-555. [Do targeted killings work? Balanced appraisal of the limited evidence available.]

Michael L. Gross, “Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-Defence?” *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 23: 3 (2006), pp. 323-335. [Why the targeted killing of suspected terrorists is ethically problematic.]

Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, “From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: Human Rights and Political Violence,” *Ethics* 118 (January 2008), pp. 228-257 [Targeted killing as a legitimate last resort.]

Ariel Colonomos, “Precision in uncertain times: targeting as a mode of justification for the use of force,” in David Chandler and Volker Heins, *Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy* (Routledge, 2007). [The language of ‘targeted killings’ helps western powers justify their wars.]

Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” *Foreign Affairs* 85: 2 (March-April 2006), pp. 95-111 [The evidence suggests they do—at least in the Israeli case.]

Christopher Finlay, “Terrorism, Resistance and the Idea of ‘Unlawful Combatancy’,” (Review Essay) *Ethics & International Affairs* 24:1 (2010), pp. 91-104. [Good overview of recent debates].

Lecture Seven (19 November): Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and Trusteeship

(Peacekeeping: evolution and effectiveness; challenges of peace-building in divided societies; politics and ethics of international trusteeship)

Peacekeeping:

Alex J. Bellamy et. al., *Understanding Peacekeeping*, second revised ed. (Polity Press, 2010), chaps. 1, 3, 4, 5. [Good conceptual and historical overview.]

*V. Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?* (Princeton UP, 2008), esp. chap. 4, pp. 76-103. [Examines the causal mechanisms that make peacekeeping effective.]

*William J. Durch, "Are We Learning Yet? The Long Road to Applying Best Practices," in Durch, ed., *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2006).

Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008), pp. 283-301. [Excellent review article.]

Building lasting peace:

Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6:3 (1969), pp. 167-191. [Classic statement of the distinction between "negative" and "positive" peace.]

*Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 40-55, and 151-211. [Stabilization before liberalization.]

Marina Ottaway, "Is Democracy the Answer?" in *Crocker Reader* [Coercive democratization doesn't work.]

**Kimberly Marten, "Is Stability the Answer?" in *Crocker Reader* [Focus on political stability.]

Fen Osler Hampson and David Mendeloff, "Intervention and the Nation-Building Debate," in *Crocker Reader* [Good overview of the contemporary debate.]

**Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War," *International Security* 30:4 (Spring 2006), pp. 87-112.

*Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton UP, 2006), esp. chap. 2, pp. 27-68.

*Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15:2 (2004), pp. 96-109. [Power sharing as a solution to political instability in divided societies].

Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, "Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy," in Roeder and Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Cornell UP, 2005), pp. 29-50. [Power sharing is part of the problem.]

Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, 20: 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. [Territorial partition as a means to lasting peace.]

Roberto Belloni, "Hybrid Peace Governance: Its Emergence and Significance," *Global Governance* 18 (2012), 21–38. [We should settle for less than full-fledged liberal democracy.]

*Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, "Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies," *International Studies Perspectives* 9:1 (2008), pp. 1-21. [Analyzes current peacebuilding challenges from a practitioner's perspective.]

Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, "Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding," in Roland Paris, Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*: (Routledge, 2009). [Good overview of the main theories and recent empirical findings.]

International Trusteeship and *Jus Post Bellum*

**Stephen Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," in *Crocker et al. Reader*.

James Fearon and David Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," *International Security* 28:4 (2004), pp. 5-43.

William Bain, "Saving Failed States: Trusteeship as an Arrangement of Security," in Bain, ed., *The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People*, (Routledge, 2006). [Critical historical and normative analysis.]

** David Edelstein, "Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding," in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding* (Routledge, 2009). [When and how can foreign military forces facilitate postwar peacebuilding?]

*Richard Caplan, "Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *International Peacekeeping* 12:3 (Autumn 2005), pp. 463–476. [Highlights the problem of accountability for international state-builders.]

Gary J. Bass, "Jus Post Bellum," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 32:4 (2004), pp. 384-412. [To what extent may outsiders legitimately transform the domestic structure of war-torn societies?]

Stefano Recchia, "Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction: How much external interference can be justified?" *Ethics & International Affairs*, 23:2 (2009), pp. 165-187. [The degree of foreign interference needs to be strictly proportional to local impediments to self-rule.]

26 November and Lent Term: lectures by Dr. Geoffrey Edwards