

International Security 2017-2018

Lecture: Tuesdays 11am – 12.00pm, ARB Room SG1

Seminar Group A: Tuesdays 4.00pm – 5.30pm, ARB Room S3

Seminar Group B: Wednesdays 4.00pm – 5.30pm, ARB Room 119

Dr. Stefano Recchia

Course Description:

This course is designed to provide MPhil students with a foundation in contemporary international security studies. The course is divided into three parts. The first part reviews the main paradigms in international relations theory and introduces students to relevant conceptual issues. The second part deals in-depth with some of the main concepts, theories, and issues in traditional international security studies. Our main focus in this part is on the causes of war, the conditions of peace, and the appropriate relationship between soldiers and civilians in decision making on national security. The third part of the course deals with “new” security issues, including humanitarian intervention, state failure, ethnic conflict, nuclear proliferation, and transnational terrorism. Throughout the course, we will apply different theories to select historical and contemporary cases in order to illustrate how theory can help us make sense of complex, real-world events. Students with no prior background in international relations theory will benefit from reading one of the two following introductory textbooks ahead of the course: Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (Norton, 1997); or G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and Joseph Grieco, *Introduction to International Relations* (Palgrave, 2014).

Course Materials: Students are encouraged to purchase the following edited book, given that it contains a significant portion of the required course readings:

- Richard K. Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, fourth edition (Routledge, 2012; previous editions are also acceptable).

Note on readings: Readings marked with ** are required (students should read ALL of them); readings marked with * are recommended (students should read two or three for each session). The required and recommended readings can be downloaded from the course website (except those to be found in the textbook). The other readings are intended as further background and guidance for students with a specific interest in the topic, and for those who are preparing seminar presentations and/or writing their MPhil thesis on a related subject.

Seminars: Beginning in the week of 17 October, in addition to the lectures there will be weekly discussion seminars. Students will be assigned to one of the two sections. Regular participation in the weekly seminars is mandatory, and students should come to their section prepared to discuss the required and recommended readings for that week. Each student will further have to contribute to group presentations in the course of the year (details TBA).

Course Schedule (Overview)

6 October 2017: Introductory Meeting [11.00am, room S1 Alison Richard Building]

PART ONE: FOUNDATIONS

10 October: The basics: Realism, Liberalism, and Social Constructivism

17 October: What is Security and Why Should we Study it?

PART TWO: TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

24 October: Inter-State War I: Systemic Causes

31 October: Inter-State War II: Individuals and Domestic Politics

7 November: Paths to Peace I: Structural Factors

14 November: Paths to Peace II: Collective Agency

21 November: Civil-Military Relations

PART THREE: “NEW” SECURITY ISSUES

28 November: Humanitarian Military Intervention

16 January 2018: Ethnic Conflict, State Failure, and Civil War

23 January: Terrorism and Counterterrorism

30 January: Nuclear Proliferation: Causes and Consequences

6 February: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and International Trusteeship

Detailed Course Schedule and Reading List:

6 October, 2017: Introductory meeting [11.00am, room S1 Alison Richard Building]
Presentation of the syllabus, goals, and course requirements

PART ONE: FOUNDATIONS

Lecture One (10 October): The basics: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism

(The three principal paradigms, or schools of thought, in international relations theory.)

**Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” *Foreign Policy* 145 (Nov. - Dec., 2004), pp. 52-62. [Clear and fairly balanced introductory overview by someone who is himself a realist].

Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 24-48. [Advocate moving beyond the three “-isms,” towards a more eclectic and pragmatic form of theorizing.]

Political Realism:

* Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [This is widely regarded as the foundational text of Western political realism.]

**Thomas Hobbes, “The State of Nature,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Hobbes has been a great source of inspiration for realist IR scholars.]

** Hans Morgenthau, “A Realist Theory of International Politics,” chapter 1 of his seminal *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1948; or any subsequent edition). [Probably the most influential summary of political realism applied to IR.]

*Kenneth Waltz, “The Anarchic Structure of World Politics,” in Robert Art and Robert Jervis, *International Politics* (London: Pearson; any edition). Alternatively, chaps. 5 and 6 of Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (Addison-Wesley, 1979). [Key statement of “neo-realism.”]

* E.H. Carr, “Realism and Idealism,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Carr was a sophisticated, complex realist. Here he lashes out against “liberal idealism.”]

John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), chap. 2. [Mearsheimer is the leading contemporary exponent of “offensive realism.”]

Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 1. [A clear and balanced overview that discusses strengths and limitations of political realism.]

Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (Norton, 1997), part one [Traces the origins of realism back to thinkers like Thucydides and Machiavelli. Keep in mind Doyle is a critic of realism].

Stefano Recchia, “Restraining Imperial Hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist International Relations Theory,” *Constellations* 14: 4 (2007), pp. 531-556. [Classical realists were not amoral theorists of power politics; instead, they advocated an ethics of restraint.]

Duncan Bell, ed., *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme* (Oxford UP, 2009). [Advanced essays on the philosophical underpinnings of realism in IR.]

Liberal Internationalism:

** Michael J. Smith, “Liberalism and International Reform,” in Terry Nardin and David Mapel, eds., *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge University Press, 1992). [Excellent overview of classical liberal internationalism and its ethical foundations.]

* Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [This short essay is one of the founding texts of liberal internationalism; read it if you haven’t done so already.]

* Giuseppe Mazzini, “Toward a Holy Alliance of the Peoples,” in Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati, eds., *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations* (Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 117-132. [Since Mazzini, “the nation” has been central to the liberal internationalist project.]

Stanley Hoffmann, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,” *Foreign Policy* 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 159-177. [Good discussion of liberalism’s inherent limitations and internal contradictions, by an overall sympathetic scholar.]

Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, “Liberal international theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands,” in Charles. Kegley, ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995). [Why liberalism is an internally consistent paradigm.]

Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization* 51: 4 (1997), pp. 513-33. [Liberalism is usually seen as a “paradigm” or “tradition”—Moravcsik tries to systematically develop a liberal theory of IR.]

Michael Doyle and Stefano Recchia, “Liberalism in International Relations,” in Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Leonardo Morlino, eds., *International Encyclopedia of Political Science* (London: Sage, 2011), pp. 1434-1439. [Concise overview of liberal IR theory.]

Social Constructivism:

** Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Probably the single most influential piece of social constructivist IR theory.]

* Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 148-165. [Clear, helpful overview by a leading constructivist thinker.]

* Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52: 4 (1998), pp. 887-917. [Develops a systematic framework for understanding how international norms change and become widely accepted.]

John Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge,” in Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 1-40. [Clear and sympathetic overview, almost a programmatic statement.]

Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics,” *International Organization* 54: 1 (2000), pp. 1-39. [Applies the social theory of Jürgen Habermas to IR.]

Dale Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,” in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, eds., *Constructivism and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1-20. [Powerful critique of the constructivist critique of realism.]

Lecture Two (17 October): What is Security and Why should we study it?

(Overview of concepts and issues: national security, human security, securitization.)

** Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," in his *Discord and Collaboration* (Johns Hopkins UP, 1962). [Critiques the realist view of national security].

** Barry Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner, 1998), esp. chapters 1, 2. [The locus classicus for "securitization."]

** Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security* 26:2 (2001), pp. 87-102. [A spirited critique of the concept.]

** Peter Lawler, "Peace Studies," in Paul Williams, ed., *Security Studies: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2008). [Good overview of peace studies as a branch of security studies].

*Fareed Zakaria, "Economics Trumps Politics," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*.

*Richard Betts, "From Cold War to Hot Peace," in his *American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security* (Columbia UP, 2012), pp. 3-18. [Traditional realist view.]

Philippe Bourbeau, Thierry Balzacq, and Myriam Dunn Cavelty, "International Relations: Celebrating eclectic dynamism in security studies," in Philippe Bourbeau, ed., *Security: A Dialogue Across Disciplines* (Cambridge UP, 2015).

Steve Smith, "The Contested Concept of Security," in Ken Booth, ed., *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (Lynne Rienner, 2005), pp. 27-62. [Good overview & discussion.]

Michael E. Brown, "New Global Dangers," in Chester A. Crocker et al., eds., *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007). [Helpful overview of the changing security landscape and resulting challenges for policy.]

Lawrence Freedman, "Does Strategic Studies Have a Future?" in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (Oxford UP, 2010). [Reviews the history of traditional security studies, or strategic studies, and speculates about the discipline's future.]

Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge UP, 2009), pp. 8-20, 30-38, 39-65. [Tracks and explains historical evolution of the subfield.]

David A. Baldwin, "The concept of security," *Review of International Studies* 23: 5 (1997), pp. 5-26. [Seeks to clarify the concept by narrowing it down.]

Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (Columbia UP, 1996) pp. 1-32.

Jon Barnett, *The Meaning of Environmental Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001). [Introduces the concept of "environmental security" as an important dimension of human security.]

Nicholas Thomas and William T. Tow, "The Utility of Human Security," *Security Dialogue* 33:2 (2002), pp. 177-192. [Defends the concept of human security.]

Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European Journal of International Relations* 14:4 (2008), pp. 563-587. [The best of the critiques.]

Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 47:4 (2003), pp. 511-532.

PART TWO: TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

Lecture Three (24 October): Inter-State War I: Systemic causes

(The three levels of analysis; anarchy and insecurity as causes of war between states.)

The level-of-analysis framework:

** J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14:1 (1961), pp. 77-92.

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), esp. Chap. 1.

System-level theories:

**Robert Gilpin, "Hegemonic War and International Change," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [The emergence of new great powers dramatically increases the risk of major war.]

**Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Explains why efforts to increase one's own security may actually decrease it; also discusses possible ways out of the dilemma.]

**Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Provocative essay, claims future wars will happen along cultural and civilizational fault lines]

*Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), chap. 2. [Excellent, comprehensive overview by two leading contemporary scholars of war.]

*Geoffrey Blainey, "Power, Culprits, and Arms," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Wars happen when states misinterpret the international distribution of power.]

*Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Wars happen because there is no common authority to prevent them.]

Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (Macmillan 1977; 4th edition Palgrave Macmillan 2012), Chap. 3, 8. [War as an institution of international society; helps uphold the balance of power.]

Jacky S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Discusses and critiques the important notion of offense-defense balance.]

Steven Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security* 22:4 (Spring, 1998), pp. 5-43 [War is more likely when conquest is easy, or thought to be easy.]

James D. Fearon, "Rationalist explanations for war," *International Organization* 49:3 (1995), pp. 379-414. [Even fully rational actors may not be able to resolve their conflicts peacefully.]

Dale Copeland, *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2000), chap. 2. [Updated realist theory, focuses on "dynamic differentials" in states' capabilities].

John Vasquez, and Christopher S. Leskiw, "The Origins and War Proneness of Interstate Rivalries," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001), pp. 295-316. [States with territorial disputes are likely to become "enduring rivals," significantly increasing the probability of war.]

Lecture Four (31 October): Inter-State War II: Individuals and Domestic Politics

(Human nature and psychology; domestic politics and regime type).

The individual level:

** Sigmund Freud, "Why War?" in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*.

** Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [War is more likely when states misperceive each others' intentions and capabilities.]

* Richard Ned Lebow, "Spirit, Standing, and Honor," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Views basic human motives as the principal causes of war: fear, interest, status, and revenge.]

* Janice Gross Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," in Leonie Huddy, David Sears, and Jack Levy, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (Oxford UP, 2013; available as E-book through library website). [Overview modern pol. psychology literature].

Robert Jervis, "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?" *Security Studies* 22 (2013), pp. 153-179. [Excellent discussion; uses examples from contemporary U.S. foreign policy].

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, Chap. 2.

John Garnett, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," in John Baylis et al, eds., *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, third ed. (Oxford UP, 2010), pp. 19-42. [Focuses in particular on theories of war based on human nature and individual instinct.]

Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25:4 (Spring 2001), pp. 107-146. [Explains when and how individual leaders can shape international political outcomes.]

Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton UP, 1986), pp. 510-526. [Leaders' belief in offense dominance was a cause of WWI].

The domestic level:

** V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Capitalist societies are inherently prone to imperialist expansionism.]

** Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Explains why transitions to democracy can be rocky and violent.]

Vipin Narang and Rebecca Nelson, "Who Are These Belligerent Democratizers? Reassessing the Impact of Democratization on War," *International Organization* 63: 2 (2009): 357-79. [Critique of Mansfield & Snyder].

* Lawrence Freedman, "The age of liberal wars," *Review of International Studies*, Special Iss., 31:1 (2005), pp. 93-107. [Discusses role of liberal values in producing military intervention].

Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), chap. 4. Alternatively, read J. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18:4 (Spring, 1988), pp. 653-673. [Solid, comprehensive overview of what we know.]

*Ernest Gellner, "Nations and Nationalism," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*.
[Nationalism, especially of the irredentist kind, as a potential cause of war.]

Stephen van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18:4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39. [Explains in more detail when and how nationalism can lead to war.]

Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Cornell UP, 1993), chapters 1-2. [War and imperial expansion as the result of domestic logrolling bargains.]

Stephen Walt, *Revolution and War* (Cornell UP, 1997), Chap. 2. [Domestic revolutions can intensify the security dilemma and thereby contribute to the outbreak of interstate war.]

Jeffrey A. Frieden, David A. Lake and Kenneth Schultz, *World Politics: Interests, Institutions, Interactions* (Norton, 2010), Chap. 4. [Another good overview of the literature.]

Lecture Five (7 November): Paths to Peace I: Structural Factors

(The balance of power; democracy and interdependence; institutions; changing norms.)

The balance of power vs. hegemony/unipolarity:

** Jack Levy, “What do Great Powers Balance Against and When?” in T.V. Paul, J. Wirtz and M. Fortmann, eds., *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st C.* (Stanford UP, 2004).

** John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Bipolarity and nuclear weapons ensured the peace in Europe—the future is bleak].

*Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier,” *Foreign Policy* 54 (Spring 1984), pp. 64-82. [American hegemony explains the postwar peace in Europe.]

* William Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” *World Politics* 61: 1 (2009), pp. 28–57 [Unipolarity reduces status competition, hence contributes to peace.]

Inis Claude, “A Critique of the Balance of Power,” in Claude, *Power and International Relations* (Random House, 1962). [Nuanced and sophisticated critique of the concept.]

Nuno Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” *International Security* 36: 3 (2011), pp. 9-40. [Challenges the unipolar peace argument].

Kenneth Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” *Daedalus* 93:3 (1964), pp. 881-909. Or, read chaps. 6, 8 of his *Theory of International Politics*. [Why bipolar systems are most stable.]

Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1962), chap. 8.

Michael Doyle, “Balancing Power Classically” in George W. Downs, ed., *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War* (U. Michigan Press, 1994). Or, read Chap. 5 of *Ways of War and Peace*.

Liberal peace: democracy and interdependence:

**Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Established liberal democracies do not fight each other – Doyle develops an explanation.]

*Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Peace as the result of complex economic interdependence.]

*G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major War* (Princeton University Press, 2001), chap. 3. [How international institutions can make balancing behaviour obsolete].

*Norman Angell, “The Great Illusion,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*.

Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001), chaps. 1, 3. [Tests the hypothesis.]

John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” *International Security* 19:2 (1994), pp.87-125. [What matters is whether states perceive each other as liberal democracies.]

Michael R. Tomz and Jessica Weeks, “Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 107: 4 (2013), pp. 849-865. [Find that public opinion in democracies does not support military strikes against other democracies.]

Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Common Interests or Common Polities?” *Journal of Politics* 59: 2 (1997), pp. 393-417. [Democracy does not actually explain the “democratic peace.”]

Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” *American Political Science Review* 97:4 (2003), pp. 585-602. [Influential piece; critiques both evidence & logic].

Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” *American Journal of Political Science* 51:1 (2007), pp. 166-191. [Capital market integration, rather than trade or democracy, as a cause of peace.]

Waltz, “Structural Causes and Economic Effects,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*.

Dale Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War* (Princeton UP, 2014), chap. 1. [Expectations about trade environment determine whether interdependence leads to peace/ war]

Katherine Barbieri, *The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?* (University of Michigan Press, 2002), Intro and Chap. 3. [Influential critique of the trade-promotes-peace hypothesis.]

Transparency and values: international institutions and normative change:

** John Mueller, “The Obsolescence of Major War,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Major war is unlikely because we have come to view it as repulsive and uncivilized.]

*Robert O. Keohane, “International institutions: Can interdependence work?” *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998), pp. 82-96. [Institutions promote peace by increasing information.]

*Richard Cobden, “Peace Through Arbitration,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*.

Robert L. Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 91:1 (2002), pp. 1-14. [Why war among developed states is now unthinkable.]

*Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*.

Dan Lindley, *Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes* (Princeton UP, 2007), pp. 1-17. [Further develops Keohane’s original intuition.]

Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom, “Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?” *World Politics* 57:1 (2004), pp. 1-38. [The type of IO matters.]

Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” *International Organization* 53:2 (1999), pp. 379-408. [The rule of non-intervention explains peaceful dispute resolution.]

Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” *International Organization* 55:2 (2001), pp. 215-250. [Borders cannot be changed.]

Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends* (Princeton UP, 2010), Chapters 1, 2. [Explains how sustained diplomatic engagement may turn rivals into friends.]

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge UP, 1998), Chapters 1-2. [Classic social constructivist conceptualization of security communities].

Jack L. Snyder, “Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War,” *International Organization* 56:1 (2002) 7-45. [A sophisticated realist challenge to culturalist arguments.]

Lecture Six (14 November): Paths to Peace II: Collective Agency

(The theory of collective security and its practical limitations; why even powerful states are constrained by the need for multilateral approval).

Collective Security

*Woodrow Wilson, "Community of Power vs. Balance of Power," in Betts reader.

**Thomas G. Weiss et al., "The Theory of UN Collective Security," in *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 6th or 7th edition (Westview Press, 2010/2013), chap. 1.

**Brian Urquhart, "[For a UN Volunteer Military Force](#)" [click on title to download], *New York Review of Books*, June 10, 1993.

*Louise Fawcett, "Regional Institutions," in Paul Williams, ed., *Security Studies: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2008). [Good overview and discussion of the role of regional institutions in the provision of international security.]

*Andrew Hurrell, "War, violence, and collective security," in his *On Global Order* (Oxford UP, 2007). [Sophisticated, historically informed analysis by one of the UK leading IR scholars.] Available as an E-book through the Cambridge University library.

Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum, *Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945* (London: Routledge, 2008), chaps. 1 and 3. [Why there is no UN force]. Available as an E-book through the Cambridge University library.

Inis L. Claude, "Collective Security as an Approach to Peace," in Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares* (New York, Random House, 1962), pp. 245-311.

John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19: 3 (1995), pp. 5-49 [International institutions are irrelevant; collective sec is a pipe dream.]

Abbé de Saint-Pierre, "A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe," in Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger, eds., *International Relations in Political Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 394-398. [The first blueprint for collective security.]

Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), chaps. 5 and 7 on the League of Nations and the UN, respectively.

Multilateral approval

**Alexander Thompson, "Coercion Through IOs," *International Organization* 60: 1 (2006), pp. 1-34. [Military intervention without IO approval may result in costly retaliation.]

**Martha Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity," *World Politics* 61 (2009), pp. 58-85. [New legitimacy norms constrain even powerful states.]

*Ian Johnstone, "When the Security Council is Divided: Imprecise Authorizations, Implied Mandates, and the 'Unreasonable Veto'," in Marc Weller, ed., *Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law* (Oxford UP, 2015). [Determining whether a particular military operation is authorized by the UN Security Council is not always straightforward.]

Stefano Recchia, "Why Seek International Organisation Approval Under Unipolarity? Averting Issue Linkage vs. Appeasing Congress," *International Relations* 30:1 (2016), pp. 78-101. [Policymakers seek IO approval to facilitate burden sharing and as a domestic insurance].

Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” *International Security* 30: 1 (2005), pp. 7-45. [Predicts that American unilateralism will be costly; very influential article.]

Dominic Tierney, “Multilateralism: America’s Insurance Policy Against Loss,” *European Journal of International Relations* 17: 4 (2011), pp. 655-678. [Multilateral approval helps socialize, or share, the risk of failure and facilitates face-saving diplomatic accommodation.]

Erik Voeten, “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force,” *International Organization* 59: 3 (2005), pp. 527-557.

Kenneth Schultz, “Tying Hands and Washing Hands: The U.S. Congress and Multilateral Humanitarian Intervention,” in Daniel Drezner, ed., *Locating the Proper Authorities* (U. Michigan Press, 2003). [UN approval helps overcome U.S. congressional opposition.]

Terrence L. Chapman and Dan Reiter, “The United Nations Security Council and the Rally ‘Round the Flag Effect,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (6), 2004, pp. 886-909.

Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 119:2 (2004), pp. 255-270. [Introduces the seminal concept of ‘soft power’ and discusses how unilateral U.S. interventions might deplete America’s soft power].

Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42: 1 (1998), pp. 3-32. [Good overview of the different reasons why states may channel military interventions through the UN or NATO].

Katharina P. Coleman, *International Organizations and Peace Enforcement* (Cambridge UP, 2007). [Intervening states, whether Nigeria, South Africa, or the US, seek international organization approval to legitimize their actions and avoid international opprobrium.]

Bruce Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony: America’s Ambiguous Relationship With the United Nations,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 7:1 (2001), pp. 103-130. [America has the “hardware” to intervene abroad—yet hegemony requires more than that.]

Lecture Seven (21 November): Civil-Military Relations

(What role do the uniformed leaders play in decision making on national security and military intervention? What role *should* they play?)

**Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 59-97. [Introduces and advocates the notion of “objective civilian control” – another classic that still influences civil-military relations today.]

**Risa Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 15-61. [Theorizes how the nature of civil-military relations affects the quality of strategic assessment during international conflicts.]

**Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University Press, 2003), chap. 3 [“The informal agency theory”].

*Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd edition (Longman, 1999), chap. 5 [Introduces the bureaucratic politics paradigm].

*Hew Strachan, “Making strategy work: civil-military relations in Britain and the United States,” in Strachan, *The Direction of War* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Jim Golby, Lindsay Cohn, and Peter Feaver, “Thanks for Your Service: Civilian and Veteran Attitudes after Fifteen Years of War,” in Kori Schake and James Mattis, eds., *Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2016).

Peter Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces & Society* 23: 2 (1996), pp. 149-178. [Views civil-military relations as a principal-agent problem, where the key problem is how to guard the guardians.]

David H. Petraeus, “Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force,” *Armed Forces and Society* 15: 4 (1989), pp. 489-505. [Challenging the conventional wisdom, shows that the generals are usually less bellicose than civilian leaders.]

C. Wright Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” *British Journal of Sociology* 9: 1 (1958), pp. 29-41. [Classic piece; argues that a new bureaucratic elite, centered around the military-industrial complex, controls foreign-policy decision making in the United States.]

Stefano Recchia, “Soldiers, Civilians, and Multilateral Humanitarian Intervention,” *Security Studies* 24: 2 (2015). [America’s military steers US interventions towards multilateralism].

James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society* 29:1 (2002), pp. 7-29. [Good overview and discussion of the two most influential theories.]

Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, “The Civil-Military Opinion Gap Over the Use of Force,” in Feaver and Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles* (Princeton University Press, 2004), Ch. 2. [Scientific study based on survey of U.S. elite opinion, confirms Petraeus’s argument.]

Dale Herspring, *Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, Chap. 1. [Compares civil-military relations in the U.S., Canada, Germany, and Russia. Civilians need to create and sustain a proper environment of mutual respect.]

Anthony Forster, “The Military Covenant and British Civil–Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society* 38: 2 (2012), pp. 273-290. [Discusses recent problems in British civ-mil relations.]

Leonard Wong and Douglas Lovelace, "Knowing When to Salute," *Orbis* 52: 2 (2008), pp. 278-288. [If civilian leaders disregard military advice, the senior officers should speak out.]

Deborah D. Avant, "Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? Why the U.S. Military is Averse to Responding to Post-Cold War Low-Level Threats," *Security Studies* 6: 2 (1996), pp. 51-90. [Views the risk-averse military as part of the U.S. system of checks & balances.]

Brooks, Risa, "Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies," in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). [How the generals can influence policymaking; and why that's problematic.]

PART THREE: “NEW” SECURITY ISSUES

Lecture Eight (28 November): Humanitarian Military Intervention

(The politics and ethics of humanitarian intervention; the Responsibility to Protect.)

**Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [How changing norms regulate and shape humanitarian intervention.]

*Sarah Sewall, “Military Options for Preventing Atrocity Crimes,” in Serena Sharma and Jennifer Welsh, eds., *The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

*Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force*, seventh ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), pp. 72-78. [Does forceful coercion short of all-out war and military occupation actually work?]

D.J.B. Trim, “Intervention in European history,” in Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh, eds., *Just and Unjust Military Intervention* (Cambridge University Press, 2013). [Humanitarian intervention is a much less recent phenomenon than commonly assumed.]

Taylor Seybolt, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure* (Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. Chaps. 1, 8. [Explains when humanitarian interventions are most likely to succeed at saving lives.]

Arguments for humanitarian intervention:

**Robert A. Pape, “When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention,” *International Security* 37: 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 41-80. [Outsiders should intervene only when they have a workable strategy to establish long-term security.]

**Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” *Foreign Affairs*, 81: 6 (November/December 2002), pp. 99-110.

Michael Walzer, “The Politics of Rescue,” *Social Research* 62:1 (Spring 1995), pp. 53-66. [Humanitarian intervention OK to stop acts that “shock the moral conscience of mankind.”]

Tom Farer, “A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention,” in Lori Fisler Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). [Still one of the best available pieces on the importance of multilateral authorization and oversight.]

Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect,” *International Security* 4: 37 (Spring 2013), pp. 199-214. [A rejoinder to Pape.]

Fernando Tesón, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” in J.L.Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge UP, 2003). [Passionate defense of humanitarian intervention from a liberal cosmopolitan standpoint.]

Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All* (Brookings Institution Press, 2009), Chaps. 2, 6.

Alex Bellamy, “The UN Security Council and the Use of Force,” in his *Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect* (Routledge, 2011), pp. 162-195.

Arguments against humanitarian intervention:

**Jennifer Welsh, “Taking consequences seriously: objections to humanitarian intervention,” in J. Welsh, ed., *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations* (Oxford UP, 2004), pp. 52-70. [Good overview and discussion of arguments against humanitarian intervention.]

*Alan J. Kuperman, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (2008), pp. 49–80. [Provocative study; claims that talk of humanitarian intervention actually emboldens secessionist extremists.]

*Roland Paris, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention,” *International Peacekeeping* 21: 5 (2014), pp. 569-603. [Questions the feasibility of preventive humanitarian intervention].

Mohammed Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” *International Journal of Human Rights*, 6:1 (2002), pp. 81-102. [HumInt as a pretext for self-serving interventions].

Jennifer Pitts, “Intervention and Sovereign Equality: Legacies of Vattel,” in Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh, eds., *Just and Unjust Military Intervention* (CUP, 2013). [Drawing on Vattel, highlights value of sovereign equality and argues there has been too much intervention.]

*Edward Luttwak, “Give war a chance,” *Foreign Affairs* 78:4 (July-August 1999), pp. 36-44. [Forget about external intervention—just let them fight it out.]

Richard K. Betts, “Confused Interventions,” in his *American Force* (Columbia UP, 2012), pp. 50-80. [If you choose to intervene, avoid half-measures and support one side decisively.]

Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” *Foreign Affairs* 75:1 (Jan./Feb. 1996), pp. 16-32. [Why liberal interventions aimed at doing good “on the cheap” are doomed to fail.]

Mahmood Mamdani, “Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 4:1 (2010), pp. 53-67.

Case study: Libya 2011

Michael Walzer, “The Case Against Our Attack on Libya,” *The New Republic*, March 20, 2011. [Prominent philosopher claims Libya didn’t meet the threshold for humanitarian interv.]

*Alan Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” *International Security* 38:1 (Summer 2013), pp. 105-136. [Provocatively argues that NATO’s intervention actually made matters significantly worse.]

*Derek Chollet and Ben Fishman, “Who Lost Libya? Obama’s Intervention in Retrospect,” *Foreign Affairs* 93:2 (May/June 2015), pp. 154-59. [Response to Kuperman. Cautious defense of the intervention, authors argue there were no good alternative options.]

Michael W. Doyle, “Libya, the Responsibility to Protect, and the New Moral Minimum,” in Doyle, *The Question of Intervention* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015).

Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, “Principles, Politics, and Prudence: Libya, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Use of Military Force,” *Global Governance* 18:3 (Summer 2012), pp. 273-297. [Basically argue that the R2P norm “produced” intervention in Libya.]

Lecture Nine (16 January): Ethnic Conflict, State Failure, and Civil War

(The causes of war within states: nationalism, ruthless elites, fear & resentment, conflict over territory, economics, weak institutions. Managing and resolving ethnic conflict.)

Ethnic conflict and civil war:

**Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma,” in Jack Snyder and Barbara Walter, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia UP, 1999).

**Ted Robert Gurr, “Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in the Twenty-First Century,” in Chester A. Crocker et al., eds., *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*. [Good overview of theories and evidence.]

*M. E. Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflicts,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 1-31. [Ruthless elites cause violent ethnic conflict.]

*Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, third ed. (London: Polity, 2012), chap. 4, pp. 71-93.

*Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?” *World Politics* 54:1 (2001), pp. 99-118. [Not really, says the author.]

*Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” Oxford University, 2006. Available online [here](#).

Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), chap. 3. [Grievances stemming from political and economic inequalities can motivate civil war.]

Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton University Press, 2005), chap. 2. [When both sides in a conflict regard control over a disputed territory as indivisible, violence is likely].

Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge University Press, 2007). [Groups with easy access to wealth are most violent, because they can entice individuals to join high-risk insurgencies.]

Steven Van Evera and Daniel Byman, “Why they fight: hypotheses on the causes of contemporary deadly conflict,” *Security Studies* 7:3 (1998), pp.1-50.

Stuart Kaufman, “An international theory of inter-ethnic war,” *Review of International Studies* 22:2 (1996), pp. 149-171. [How theories of inter-state war can help us understand ethnic war.]

Connor Cruise O’Brien, “The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism’s Primordial Roots,” *Foreign Affairs*, 72: 5 (November/Dec. 1993), pp. 142-149. [Nationalism has ancient roots.]

Roger D. Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence* (Cambridge UP, 2002), pp. 17-84. [Popular emotions and collective resentment as the source of ethnic violence.]

James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97:1(2003), pp.75-90.[State weakness and rough terrain make civil war likely.]

Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension* (Michigan UP, 2009). [Good edited volume on civil war; Part III of the volume addresses ethnic conflict].

Managing and resolving ethnic conflict:

**Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Territorial partition as a means to lasting inter-ethnic peace.]

*Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15:2 (2004), pp. 96-109. [Power sharing as a solution to political instability in divided societies.]

Donald Horowitz, "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems," *Journal of Democracy* 25: 2 (2014), pp. 5-20. [The most influential among Lijphart's critics].

Monica Duffy Toft, "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?" *International Security* 34: 4 (2010), pp. 7-36. [Claims that rebel victory is most likely to result in stable peace.]

Ulrich Schneckener, "Models of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: The Politics of Recognition," in Schneckener and Wolff, eds., *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts* (Palgrave, 2004). [Good overview of different ways of regulating ethnic conflict so as to avoid war.]

Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, "Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy," in Roeder and Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Cornell UP, 2005), pp. 29-50. [Ethnic power sharing is part of the problem.]

State Failure:

**Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist," *World Politics* 35:1 (1982), pp.1-24. [Explains how contemporary sovereignty norms allow weak states to survive.]

*Pierre Englebort and Denis M. Tull, "Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States," *International Security* 32:4 (2008), pp. 106-139. [External assistance is based on mistaken assumptions and less likely to succeed than indigenous programs].

*Robert I. Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton University Press, 2003), chap. 1. [States fail when they are no longer able to provide basic political goods.]

*Jeffrey Herbst, "Let them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice," in Robert Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail* (Princeton UP, 2003). [Proposes "decertification" of failed states.]

*Tilly, Charles, "War making and state making as organized crime," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge University Press, 1985). [Past inter-state wars have led to the emergence of strong, accountable states.]

Sorenson, George, "War and State-Making: Why Doesn't it Work in the Third World?" *Security Dialogue* 32: 3 (September 2001), pp. 341-354. [What happens to state-building if decisive inter-state war is no longer feasible? Applies Tilly's analysis to the developing world.]

Ann Hironaka, *Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War* (Harvard University Press, 2005). [International norms against invasion, annexation, and secession explain persistent state weakness and civil-war proneness.]

Mahmood Mamdani, "Historicizing Power and Responses to Power: Indirect Rule and Its Reform," *Social Research* 66:3 (Fall 1999), pp. 859-886. [How the colonial legacy helps us understand today's reality of weak and ethnically divided states in Africa.]

Lecture Ten (23 January): Terrorism and Counterterrorism

(Causes of terrorism; suicide terrorism; strategies of counterterrorism; targeted killing.)

Terrorism – understanding the causes:

**Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*.

**Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), chaps. 1-2, pp. 19-86. [Suicide terrorism as a form of resistance to foreign military occupation.]

*Mark Juergensmeyer, “Religious Radicalism and Political Violence,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*.

*Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, rev. and expanded ed. (Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 1-45. [Very good conceptual and historical overview.]

Charles Tilly, “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,” *Sociological Theory* 22: 1 (March 2004), pp. 5-13. [Tilly brings some much-needed conceptual clarity to the debate.]

Dipak K. Gupta, *Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence* (Routledge, 2008), chap. 3 [Highlights the desire to belong to a group as a motivating factor for terrorists.]

Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Motives and Counterterrorist Strategy,” *International Security* 32:4 (Spring 2008), pp. 78-105. [Terrorists seek social solidarity.]

Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” *International Security* 31:1 (Summer 2006), pp. 49-79.

Ayse Zarakol, “What makes terrorism modern? Terrorism, legitimacy, and the international system,” *Review of International Studies* 37:5 (2011), pp. 2311-2336. [Identifies two types of terrorism, system-affirming and system-threatening, and discusses their implications].

James A. Piazza, “Incubators of Terror? Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism,” *International Studies Quarterly* 52:3 (2008), pp. 469-488. [Unsurprisingly, yes.]

Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17:4 (Fall 2003), pp. 119–144. [Poverty does not cause terrorism.]

Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” *American Economic Review*, 96:2 (2006), pp.50–56. [Political regime instability makes terrorism likely.]

Michael C. Horowitz, “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism,” *International Organization* 64:1 (Winter 2010), pp. 33-64. [Why do certain groups adopt suicide bombing, while others don't?]

Erica Chenoweth, “Terrorism and Democracy,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 16 (2013): 355-378. [Are democracies more or less likely targets of terrorism than other regime types?]

Debating counterterrorism strategies:

**John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11,” *International Security* 37: 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81-110. [Provocative piece suggesting the cure might be worse than the disease.]

*Paul R. Pillar, “Dealing with Terrorists,” in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force*, seventh ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), pp. 501-508.

*Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” *International Security* 31:1 (2006) 7-48. [No single strategy will work, but we can learn a lot by studying how previous terrorist organizations have ended.]

Arjun Chowdhury and Ronald R. Krebs, “Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy, Political Networks, and Counterterrorism,” *Security Studies* 18:3 (July 2009), pp. 371-399. [Discusses how moderates can be strengthened in terrorism-prone societies.]

Daniel Byman, *Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad* (Wiley, 2008). [Advocates a multi-pronged strategy. Focus on U.S. vs. Al-Qaeda.]

Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, eds., *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past* (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007) esp. Chap. 16. [Force alone is unlikely to succeed.]

Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad,” *The National Interest*, May-June 2010, pp. 17-28. [The U.S. has been too narrowly focused on a “kill or capture” approach targeting individuals.]

William B. Messmer and Carlos L. Yordan, “A Partnership to Counter International Terrorism: The UN Security Council and the UN Member States,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34:11 (2011), pp. 843-861. [Counterterrorism cooperation at the UN has been reasonably effective.]

The politics and ethics of targeted killing:

**David Luban, “What Would Augustine Do? The President, Drones, and Just War Theory,” *The Boston Review*, June 6, 2012. [A spirited discussion of the principal moral issues.]

*Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, “Toward a Drone Accountability Regime,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 29: 1 (2015), pp. 15-37. [How to ensure accountability for drone strikes].

*Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” *Foreign Affairs* 92 (July-August 2013), pp. 32-43 [Drones are the lesser evil.]

*Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* 92 (July-August 2013), pp. 44-54. [Drones may help win the battle, but meanwhile lose the war.]

Michael Walzer, “Terrorism: A critique of excuses” [Terrorism cannot be excused, not even as a last resort]; and “After 9/11: Five Questions about terrorism,” [Why killing terrorist leaders is morally justified]. In: Michael Walzer, *Arguing About War* (Yale UP, 2004).

Stephanie Carvin, “The Trouble with Targeted Killing,” *Security Studies* 21:3 (Fall 2012), pp. 529-555. [Do targeted killings work? Balanced appraisal of the limited available evidence.]

Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” *International Security* 38:4 (2014), pp. 7-38. [Argues terrorist groups are more resilient when they feature bureaucratization and communal support]

Patrick B. Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," *International Security* 36:4 (2012), pp. 47-79. [Clever research design showing decapitation increases the probability of COIN success]

Michael L. Gross, "Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-Defence?" *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 23: 3 (2006), pp. 323-335. [Why the targeted killing of suspected terrorists is ethically problematic.]

Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, "From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: Human Rights and Political Violence," *Ethics* 118 (January 2008), pp. 228–257 [Targeted killing as a legitimate last resort.]

Christopher Finlay, "Terrorism, Resistance and the Idea of 'Unlawful Combatancy'," (Review Essay) *Ethics & International Affairs* 24:1 (2010), pp. 91-104. [Good overview of recent debates].

Lecture Eleven (30 January): Nuclear Proliferation

(Is the spread of nuclear weapons to be feared or welcomed? What explains it?)

Nuclear proliferation—the causes:

* “Nuclear Weapons: The unkicked addiction,” *The Economist*, 7 March 2015. Available [here](#).

**Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security* 21 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-86. [External security threats alone don’t explain why states want to acquire nuclear weapons.]

**Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton University Press, 2007), chaps. 1-2. [States whose leaders advocate integration in the global economy are less likely to go nuclear.]

*Matthew Kroenig, *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (Cornell UP, 2010), pp. 1-49. [States offer nuclear proliferation assistance to others when they think it is likely to hurt their enemies.]

Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation,” *International Security* 39: 2 (Fall 2014), pp. 7-51. [Strategic interaction and relative capabilities determine nuclear proliferation].

Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51:1 (2007), pp. 167-194. [The authors find that security concerns and technological capabilities largely determine whether states form nuclear weapons programs.]

Matthew Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” *International Security* 34: 1 (2009), pp. 7-41. [States that receive peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to initiate weapons programs.]

Dan Reiter, “Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, forthcoming (article can be downloaded from the journal’s website). [Finds that third party security commitments can reduce nuclear weapons proliferation.]

Jacques E.C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation* (Cambridge UP, 2006), 1-46. [“Oppositional nationalist” leaders are most likely to want the bomb.]

*George Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems,” *Arms Control Today*, December 2003. Available online [here](#).

Nicholas L. Miller, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,” *International Organization* 68: 4 (Fall 2014), pp. 913-944. [The threat of sanctions has deterred potential proliferators from going nuclear.]

Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions,” *International Security* 39:4 (2015), pp. 91-129. [Nuclear proliferation and the dynamics of intra-alliance bargaining]

Nuclear proliferation—the consequences:

**Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*.

**Scott Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” *International Security* 18: 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 66-107.

*Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,” *International Security* 38:1 (Summer 2013), pp. 80-104.

John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” *International Security* 10:4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142. [Nuclear deterrence and bipolarity largely explain why the Cold War has not become “hot.”]

John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” *International Security* 13:2 (Fall 1988), pp. 55-79. [Nuclear weapons—really?]

Robert Jervis, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment,” *International Security* 13:2 (Fall 1988), pp. 80-90. [A realist skeptic’s reply to Mueller.]

Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” *International Organization* 53:3 (1999), pp. 433-468. [Socially constructed norms, rather than deterrence, explain why nuclear weapons have never been used in war.]

Case study – North Korea:

*Mark Bowden, “How to deal with North Korea,” *The Atlantic* magazine, July-August 2017. Available [here](#). [Excellent discussion of the various policy options available].

Patrick Morgan, “North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Nonproliferation or Deterrence? Or Both?,” in Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen, eds., *North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence* (Georgetown University Press, 2017).

Thomas Plant and Ben Rhode, “China, North Korea and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” *Survival* 55:2 (2013), pp. 61-80.

Dingli Shen, “North Korea, nuclear weapons, and the search for a new path forward: A Chinese response,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 72:5 (2016), pp. 345-347.

Lecture Twelve (6 February): Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and Trusteeship

(Peacekeeping: evolution and effectiveness; challenges of peace-building in divided societies; politics and ethics of international trusteeship)

Peacekeeping:

**V. Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?* (Princeton UP, 2008), esp. chap. 4, pp. 76-103. [Examines the causal mechanisms that make peacekeeping effective.]

*Alex J. Bellamy et. al., *Understanding Peacekeeping*, second revised ed. (Polity Press, 2010), chaps. 1, 3, 4, 5. [Good conceptual and historical overview.]

William J. Durch, "Are We Learning Yet? The Long Road to Applying Best Practices," in Durch, ed., *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2006).

Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008), pp. 283-301. [Excellent review article.]

Building lasting peace:

**Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War," *International Security* 30:4 (Spring 2006), pp. 87-112.

*Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chap. 10. [Stabilization before liberalization.]

*Aaron Rapport, "The Long and Short of It: Cognitive Constraints on Leaders' Assessments of 'Postwar' Iraq," *International Security* 37:3 (2012), pp. 133-171. [A psychological explanation for why leaders don't take the risks of peacekeeping and reconstruction as seriously as those regarding combat operations]

Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton UP, 2006), esp. Chap. 2, pp. 27-68.

Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, "Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies," *International Studies Perspectives* 9:1 (2008), pp. 1-21. [Analyzes current peacebuilding challenges from a practitioner's perspective.]

Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6:3 (1969), pp. 167-191. [Classic statement of the distinction between "negative" and "positive" peace.]

Roberto Belloni, "Hybrid Peace Governance: Its Emergence and Significance," *Global Governance* 18 (2012), 21-38. [We should settle for less than full-fledged liberal democracy.]

Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, "Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding," in Roland Paris, Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*: (Routledge, 2009). [Good overview of the main theories and recent empirical findings.]

International Trusteeship and *Jus Post Bellum*

**Stephen Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” *International Security* 29:2 (2004), pp. 85-120. [War-torn states can never again be sovereign].

** David Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding,” in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding* (Routledge, 2009). [When and how can foreign military forces facilitate postwar peacebuilding?]

*Jeremy Weinstein, “Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective,” *Center for Global Development Working Paper NO. 57*, April 2005. Available [here](#). [Critique of interventionist state-building strategies].

James Mayall, “The European Empires and International Order: Model or Trap?” in J. Mayall and R. Soares de Oliveira, eds., *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States* (London: Hurst, 2011).

Richard Caplan, “Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *International Peacekeeping* 12:3 (Autumn 2005), pp. 463–476. [Highlights the problem of accountability for international state-builders.]

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