International Security
2017-2018

Lecture: Tuesdays 11am – 12.00pm, ARB Room SG1
Seminar Group A: Tuesdays 4.00pm – 5.30pm, ARB Room S3
Seminar Group B: Wednesdays 4.00pm – 5.30pm, ARB Room 119

Dr. Stefano Recchia

Course Description:
This course is designed to provide MPhil students with a foundation in contemporary international security studies. The course is divided into three parts. The first part reviews the main paradigms in international relations theory and introduces students to relevant conceptual issues. The second part deals in-depth with some of the main concepts, theories, and issues in traditional international security studies. Our main focus in this part is on the causes of war, the conditions of peace, and the appropriate relationship between soldiers and civilians in decision making on national security. The third part of the course deals with “new” security issues, including humanitarian intervention, state failure, ethnic conflict, nuclear proliferation, and transnational terrorism. Throughout the course, we will apply different theories to select historical and contemporary cases in order to illustrate how theory can help us make sense of complex, real-world events. Students with no prior background in international relations theory will benefit from reading one of the two following introductory textbooks ahead of the course: Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (Norton, 1997); or G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and Joseph Grieco, Introduction to International Relations (Palgrave, 2014).

Course Materials: Students are encouraged to purchase the following edited book, given that it contains a significant portion of the required course readings:

- Richard K. Betts, ed., Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, fourth edition (Routledge, 2012; previous editions are also acceptable).

Note on readings: Readings marked with ** are required (students should read ALL of them); readings marked with * are recommended (students should read two or three for each session). The required and recommended readings can be downloaded from the course website (except those to be found in the textbook). The other readings are intended as further background and guidance for students with a specific interest in the topic, and for those who are preparing seminar presentations and/or writing their MPhil thesis on a related subject.

Seminars: Beginning in the week of 17 October, in addition to the lectures there will be weekly discussion seminars. Students will be assigned to one of the two sections. Regular participation in the weekly seminars is mandatory, and students should come to their section prepared to discuss the required and recommended readings for that week. Each student will further have to contribute to group presentations in the course of the year (details TBA).
Course Schedule (Overview)

6 October 2017: Introductory Meeting [11.00am, room S1 Alison Richard Building]

**PART ONE: FOUNDATIONS**

10 October: The basics: Realism, Liberalism, and Social Constructivism

17 October: What is Security and Why Should we Study it?

**PART TWO: TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES**

24 October: Inter-State War I: Systemic Causes

31 October: Inter-State War II: Individuals and Domestic Politics

7 November: Paths to Peace I: Structural Factors

14 November: Paths to Peace II: Collective Agency

21 November: Civil-Military Relations

**PART THREE: “NEW” SECURITY ISSUES**

28 November: Humanitarian Military Intervention

16 January 2018: Ethnic Conflict, State Failure, and Civil War

23 January: Terrorism and Counterterrorism

30 January: Nuclear Proliferation: Causes and Consequences

6 February: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and International Trusteeship
**Detailed Course Schedule and Reading List:**

**6 October, 2017: Introductory meeting** [11.00am, room S1 Alison Richard Building]
Presentation of the syllabus, goals, and course requirements

**PART ONE: FOUNDATIONS**

**Lecture One (10 October): The basics: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism**
(The three principal paradigms, or schools of thought, in international relations theory.)

**Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy 145 (Nov. - Dec., 2004), pp. 52-62. [Clear and fairly balanced introductory overview by someone who is himself a realist].

Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2010), pp. 24-48. [Advocate moving beyond the three “-isms,” towards a more eclectic and pragmatic form of theorizing.]

Political Realism:

* Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [This is widely regarded as the foundational text of Western political realism.]

**Thomas Hobbes, “The State of Nature,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Hobbes has been a great source of inspiration for realist IR scholars.]


* E.H. Carr, “Realism and Idealism,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Carr was a sophisticated, complex realist. Here he lashes out against “liberal idealism.”]

John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), chap. 2. [Mearsheimer is the leading contemporary exponent of “offensive realism.”]

Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 1. [A clear and balanced overview that discusses strengths and limitations of political realism.]

Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (Norton, 1997), part one [Traces the origins of realism back to thinkers like Thucydides and Machiavelli. Keep in mind Doyle is a critic of realism].

Stefano Recchia, “Restraining Imperial Hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist International Relations Theory,” Constellations 14: 4 (2007), pp. 531-556. [Classical realists were not amoral theorists of power politics; instead, they advocated an ethics of restraint.]

Ducan Bell, ed., Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford UP, 2009). [Advanced essays on the philosophical underpinnings of realism in IR.]

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Liberal Internationalism:


* Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [This short essay is one of the founding texts of liberal internationalism; read it if you haven’t done so already.]


Stanley Hoffmann, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,” *Foreign Policy* 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 159-177. [Good discussion of liberalism’s inherent limitations and internal contradictions, by an overall sympathetic scholar.]


Social Constructivism:

** Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Probably the single most influential piece of social constructivist IR theory.]


Lecture Two (17 October): What is Security and Why should we study it?
(Overview of concepts and issues: national security, human security, securitization.)


**Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner, 1998), esp. chapters 1, 2. [The locus classicus for “securitization.”]


*Fareed Zakaria, “Economics Trumps Politics,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War.


Lawrence Freedman, “Does Strategic Studies Have a Future?” in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin Gray, Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford UP, 2010). [Reviews the history of traditional security studies, or strategic studies, and speculates about the discipline’s future.]


PART TWO: TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

Lecture Three (24 October): Inter-State War I: Systemic causes
(The three levels of analysis; anarchy and insecurity as causes of war between states.)

The level-of-analysis framework:


Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), esp. Chap. 1.

System-level theories:

** Robert Gilpin, “Hegemonic War and International Change,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [The emergence of new great powers dramatically increases the risk of major war.]

** Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Explains why efforts to increase one’s own security may actually decrease it; also discusses possible ways out of the dilemma.]

** Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Provocative essay, claims future wars will happen along cultural and civilizational fault lines]

* Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), chap. 2. [Excellent, comprehensive overview by two leading contemporary scholars of war.]

* Geoffrey Blainey, “Power, Culprits, and Arms,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Wars happen when states misinterpret the international distribution of power.]

* Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Wars happen because there is no common authority to prevent them.]


Jacky S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Discusses and critiques the important notion of offense-defense balance.]

Steven Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22:4 (Spring, 1998), pp. 5-43 [War is more likely when conquest is easy, or thought to be easy.]


John Vasquez, and Christopher S. Leskiw, “The Origins and War Proneness of Interstate Rivalries,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001), pp. 295-316. [States with territorial disputes are likely to become “enduring rivals,” significantly increasing the probability of war.]
Lecture Four (31 October): Inter-State War II: Individuals and Domestic Politics
(Human nature and psychology; domestic politics and regime type).

The individual level:

** Sigmund Freud, “Why War?” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War.

**Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [War is more likely when states misperceive each others’ intentions and capabilities.]

*Richard Ned Lebow, “Spirit, Standing, and Honor,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Views basic human motives as the principal causes of war: fear, interest, status, and revenge.]


Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, Chap. 2.


The domestic level:

**V.I. Lenin, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Capitalist societies are inherently prone to imperialist expansionism.]

**Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Explains why transitions to democracy can be rocky and violent.]


*Ernest Gellner, “Nations and Nationalism,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War.* [Nationalism, especially of the irredentist kind, as a potential cause of war.]


Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Cornell UP, 1993), chapters 1-2. [War and imperial expansion as the result of domestic logrolling bargains.]

Stephen Walt, *Revolution and War* (Cornell UP, 1997), Chap. 2. [Domestic revolutions can intensify the security dilemma and thereby contribute to the outbreak of interstate war.]

Jeffrey A. Frieden, David A. Lake and Kenneth Schultz, *World Politics: Interests, Institutions, Interactions* (Norton, 2010), Chap. 4. [Another good overview of the literature.]
Lecture Five (7 November): Paths to Peace I: Structural Factors
(The balance of power; democracy and interdependence; institutions; changing norms.)

The balance of power vs. hegemony/unipolarity:


** John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Bipolarity and nuclear weapons ensured the peace in Europe—the future is bleak].

* Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier,” Foreign Policy 54 (Spring 1984), pp. 64-82. [American hegemony explains the postwar peace in Europe.]


Liberal peace: democracy and interdependence:

** Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Established liberal democracies do not fight each other – Doyle develops an explanation.]

* Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [Peace as the result of complex economic interdependence.]

* G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major War (Princeton University Press, 2001), chap. 3. [How international institutions can make balancing behaviour obsolete].

* Norman Angell, “The Great Illusion,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War.


Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Common Interests or Common Polities?” *Journal of Politics* 59: 2 (1997), pp. 393-417. [Democracy does not actually explain the “democratic peace.”]


**Transparency and values: international institutions and normative change:**

** John Mueller, “The Obsolescence of Major War,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War.* [Major war is unlikely because we have come to view it as repulsive and uncivilized.]

* Robert O. Keohane, “International institutions: Can interdependence work?” *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998), pp. 82-96. [Institutions promote peace by increasing information.]


* Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War.*


 Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends* (Princeton UP, 2010), Chapters 1, 2. [Explains how sustained diplomatic engagement may turn rivals into friends.]


Lecture Six (14 November): Paths to Peace II: Collective Agency
(The theory of collective security and its practical limitations; why even powerful states are constrained by the need for multilateral approval).

Collective Security


Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Allen Lane, 2012), chaps. 5 and 7 on the League of Nations and the UN, respectively.

Multilateral approval


Katharina P. Coleman, *International Organizations and Peace Enforcement* (Cambridge UP, 2007). [Intervening states, whether Nigeria, South Africa, or the US, seek international organization approval to legitimize their actions and avoid international opprobrium.]

Bruce Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony: America’s Ambiguous Relationship With the United Nations,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 7:1 (2001), pp. 103-130. [America has the “hardware” to intervene abroad—yet hegemony requires more than that.]
Lecture Seven (21 November): Civil-Military Relations
(What role do the uniformed leaders play in decision making on national security and military intervention? What role should they play?)


**Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University Press, 2003), chap. 3 [“The informal agency theory”].

*Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd edition (Longman, 1999), chap. 5 [Introduces the bureaucratic politics paradigm].


David H. Petraeus, “Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force,” *Armed Forces and Society* 15: 4 (1989), pp. 489-505. [Challenging the conventional wisdom, shows that the generals are usually less bellicose than civilian leaders.]


Dale Herspring, *Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, Chap. 1. [Compares civil-military relations in the U.S., Canada, Germany, and Russia. Civilians need to create and sustain a proper environment of mutual respect.]

Leonard Wong and Douglas Lovelace, “Knowing When to Salute,” *Orbis* 52: 2 (2008), pp. 278-288. [If civilian leaders disregard military advice, the senior officers should speak out.]


PART THREE: “NEW” SECURITY ISSUES

Lecture Eight (28 November): Humanitarian Military Intervention
(The politics and ethics of humanitarian intervention; the Responsibility to Protect.)

**Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War. [How changing norms regulate and shape humanitarian intervention.]


Taylor Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. Chaps. 1, 8. [Explains when humanitarian interventions are most likely to succeed at saving lives.]

Arguments for humanitarian intervention:


Arguments against humanitarian intervention:


Jennifer Pitts, “Intervention and Sovereign Equality: Legacies of Vattel,” in Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh, eds., Just and Unjust Military Intervention (CUP, 2013). [Drawing on Vattel, highlights value of sovereign equality and argues there has been too much intervention.]

*Edward Luttwak, “Give war a chance,” Foreign Affairs 78:4 (July-August 1999), pp. 36-44. [Forget about external intervention—just let them fight it out.]

Richard K. Betts, “Confused Interventions,” in his American Force (Columbia UP, 2012), pp. 50-80. [If you choose to intervene, avoid half-measures and support one side decisively.]

Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs 75:1 (Jan./Feb. 1996), pp. 16-32. [Why liberal interventions aimed at doing good “on the cheap” are doomed to fail.]


Case study: Libya 2011


*Derek Chollet and Ben Fishman, “Who Lost Libya? Obama’s Intervention in Retrospect,” Foreign Affairs 93:2 (May/June 2015), pp. 154-59. [Response to Kuperman. Cautious defense of the intervention, authors argue there were no good alternative options.]


Lecture Nine (16 January): Ethnic Conflict, State Failure, and Civil War
(The causes of war within states: nationalism, ruthless elites, fear & resentment, conflict over territory, economics, weak institutions. Managing and resolving ethnic conflict.)

Ethnic conflict and civil war:


Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), chap. 3. [Grievances stemming from political and economic inequalities can motivate civil war.]

Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton University Press, 2005), chap. 2. [When both sides in a conflict regard control over a disputed territory as indivisible, violence is likely].

Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge University Press, 2007). [Groups with easy access to wealth are most violent, because they can entice individuals to join high-risk insurgencies.]


Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence (Cambridge UP, 2002), pp. 17-84. [Popular emotions and collective resentment as the source of ethnic violence.]


Managing and resolving ethnic conflict:

**Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” in Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War*. [Territorial partition as a means to lasting inter-ethnic peace.]


Monica Duffy Toft, “Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?” *International Security* 34:4 (2010), pp. 7-36. [Claims that rebel victory is most likely to result in stable peace.]


Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, “Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy,” in Roeder and Rotchild eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Cornell UP, 2005), pp. 29-50. [Ethnic power sharing is part of the problem.]

State Failure:


*Robert I. Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton University Press, 2003), chap. 1. [States fail when they are no longer able to provide basic political goods.]


*Tilly, Charles, “War making and state making as organized crime,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge University Press, 1985). [Past inter-state wars have led to the emergence of strong, accountable states.]


Mahmood Mamdani, “Historicizing Power and Responses to Power: Indirect Rule and Its Reform,” *Social Research* 66:3 (Fall 1999), pp. 859-886. [How the colonial legacy helps us understand today’s reality of weak and ethnically divided states in Africa.]
Lecture Ten (23 January): Terrorism and Counterterrorism
(Causes of terrorism; suicide terrorism; strategies of counterterrorism; targeted killing.)

Terrorism – understanding the causes:

**Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War.

**Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), chaps. 1-2, pp. 19-86. [Suicide terrorism as a form of resistance to foreign military occupation.]

*Mark Juergensmeyer, “Religious Radicalism and Political Violence,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War.


Dipak K. Gupta, Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence (Routledge, 2008), chap. 3 [Highlights the desire to belong to a group as a motivating factor for terrorists.]


Michael C. Horowitz, “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism,” International Organization 64:1 (Winter 2010), pp. 33-64. [Why do certain groups adopt suicide bombing, while others don’t?]

Erica Chenoweth, “Terrorism and Democracy,” Annual Review of Political Science 16 (2013): 355-378. [Are democracies more or less likely targets of terrorism than other regime types?]
Debating counterterrorism strategies:


Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad,” The National Interest, May-June 2010, pp. 17-28. [The U.S. has been too narrowly focused on a “kill or capture” approach targeting individuals.]

William B. Messmer and Carlos L. Yordan, “A Partnership to Counter International Terrorism: The UN Security Council and the UN Member States,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34:11 (2011), pp. 843-861. [Counterterrorism cooperation at the UN has been reasonably effective.]

The politics and ethics of targeted killing:


*Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 92 (July-August 2013), pp. 44-54. [Drones may help win the battle, but meanwhile lose the war.]

Michael Walzer, “Terrorism: A critique of excuses” [Terrorism cannot be excused, not even as a last resort]; and “After 9/11: Five Questions about terrorism,” [Why killing terrorist leaders is morally justified]. In: Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (Yale UP, 2004).


**Lecture Eleven (30 January): Nuclear Proliferation**

(Is the spread of nuclear weapons to be feared or welcomed? What explains it?)

Nuclear proliferation—the causes:


**Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton University Press, 2007), chaps. 1-2. [States whose leaders advocate integration in the global economy are less likely to go nuclear.]

*Matthew Kroenig, *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (Cornell UP, 2010), pp. 1-49. [States offer nuclear proliferation assistance to others when they think it is likely to hurt their enemies.]


Matthew Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” *International Security* 34: 1 (2009), pp. 7-41. [States that receive peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to initiate weapons programs.]

Dan Reiter, “Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, forthcoming (article can be downloaded from the journal’s website). [Finds that third party security commitments can reduce nuclear weapons proliferation.]

Jacques E.C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation* (Cambridge UP, 2006), 1-46. [“Oppositional nationalist” leaders are most likely to want the bomb.]


Nuclear proliferation—the consequences:

**Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War.**


Case study – North Korea:

*Mark Bowden, “How to deal with North Korea,” The Atlantic magazine, July-August 2017. Available here. [Excellent discussion of the various policy options available].


Lecture Twelve (6 February): Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and Trusteeship
(Peacekeeping: evolution and effectiveness; challenges of peace-building in divided societies; politics and ethics of international trusteeship)

Peacekeeping:

**V. Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?* (Princeton UP, 2008), esp. chap. 4, pp. 76-103. [Examines the causal mechanisms that make peacekeeping effective.]

*Alex J. Bellamy et. al., *Understanding Peacekeeping*, second revised ed. (Polity Press, 2010), chaps. 1, 3, 4, 5. [Good conceptual and historical overview.]


Building lasting peace:


International Trusteeship and *Jus Post Bellum*


Stefano Recchia, “Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction: How much external interference can be justified?” *Ethics & International Affairs*, 23:2 (2009), pp. 165-187. [The degree of foreign interference needs to be strictly proportional to local impediments to self-rule.]


Dominik Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox: The norms and politics of international statebuilding* (Oxford UP, 2007), chaps. 2, 3. [In-depth study of the socially constructed norms underpinning international state-building projects].