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Book Reviews

Moreover, Krause's clear identification of the condition—hegemony—under which even multiparty movements can achieve success sets his work apart from other studies that point to the perilous effects of intramovement divisions but fail to provide an explanation for variation in movement outcomes.

Krause tests MST with longitudinal case studies of four movements—Palestinian (1965–2016), Zionist (1921–1949), Algerian (1944–1962), and Irish (1914–1998) – marshalling an impressive array of sources, including interviews with nationalist leaders and archival materials, besides the vast secondary literature. Consistent with the argument, these self-determination movements were most successful during hegemonic phases, while with a balanced distribution of power they tended to experience the counterproductive dynamics mentioned earlier. Most strikingly, the behavior of organizations appears to be powerfully shaped by their position in the hierarchy of power within the movement, with groups that engaged in violent outbidding when relatively weak switching to policies of restraint aimed at maximizing gains against the government once in hegemonic position.

In the final chapter, Krause offers an insightful overview of what he calls “the loose ends of MST,” aspects of his arguments that may stimulate future research. What is perhaps missing here is a more explicit discussion of the relationship between MST and theories about the causes of civil wars. Each of the four movements at some point waged war against the incumbent, but in all instances, except the Irish War of Independence, large-scale violence was the result of outbidding and chain-ganging initiatives of relatively weak groups rather than a purposeful decision of the leading organizations. Future research may shed light on whether this pattern of civil war onset is indeed prevalent and whether intramovement dynamics are merely affecting the timing of war (pulling the dominant organizations in armed conflict that they are not yet ready for) or causing a war that would not otherwise happen, by precluding the continuation of nonviolent resistance tactics.

In sum, this book is a rare combination of elegant theorizing and rich empirical analysis, which will no doubt influence scholars' and policymakers' thinking for years to come.

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A History of the Iraq Crisis: France, the United States, and Iraq, 1991–2003 by Frédéric Bozo. New York, Columbia University Press, 2016. 408 pp. \$55.00.

The history of the transatlantic standoff between France and the United States over Iraq has been told many times. In 2004, Philip Gordon and Jeremy

Shapiro offered a useful first draft of history in their *Allies at War*. That was followed by numerous journalistic accounts, scholarly analyses, and insightful, if often self-serving, memoirs. Drawing on a wealth of French diplomatic documents, Frédéric Bozo presents a more fine-grained picture of French government thinking during the crisis than has hitherto been available.

Bozo shows that there were important intragovernmental disagreements between French policymakers at the Elysée palace (the French presidency) and the Quai d'Orsay (the foreign ministry) in the run-up to the war. From the fall of 2002 onward, senior foreign ministry officials—such as Jean-David Levitte, France's ambassador to the United Nations, and Bruno Le Maire, senior adviser to Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin—emphasized the likely costs of opposition to the United States, which in their view risked “breaking the strategic link” between Paris and Washington (p. 135). Villepin seems to have believed that France should refrain from vetoing a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force (p. 139). After it became clear in early 2003 that the George W. Bush administration was determined to go to war, Villepin recommended that France specify the conditions under which it would support military action (p. 178).

But President Jacques Chirac and his advisers at the Elysée were rather more determined in their opposition to U.S. war plans. In Bozo's reading, for Chirac, this was primarily about upholding “a certain conception of the international order” (p. 135) based on international law and concerted management by the great powers. From about mid-January 2003 onward, Chirac realized that he could no longer avert a war. His main goal, then, became “to prevent the Americans and their allies from obtaining UN legitimacy” (p. 249).

The French wanted to avoid having to choose between actually casting a UN veto or letting a resolution authorizing military action pass. Hence, they worked hard to forge a blocking coalition at the UN Security Council that would dissuade Washington from requesting a vote in the first place. Chirac ultimately chose to publicly threaten a veto on 10 March 2003, in order to provide political cover to hesitant Security Council members such as Mexico and Chile and convince them to withdraw their support from the U.S.-sponsored draft resolution. This may well have been a bluff. However, as Bozo notes, Chirac and his advisers had not anticipated that the price to pay for dissuading Washington from trying to obtain a resolution “ultimately would prove just as prohibitive for Paris as the cost of actually casting a veto” (p. 233).

Perhaps the book is somewhat too generous to Chirac in portraying his opposition to the Iraq War as driven largely by principle, when less high-minded political considerations also seem to have played an important role. Furthermore, Bozo has had access to French diplomatic documents on the

Iraq crisis thanks to high-level contacts in Paris; but the documents are still formally classified, which means that other researchers will not be able to replicate and check his findings for at least another decade. This poses a problem in terms of research transparency. But these are quibbles. We can only speculate about Chirac's deepest motives, and Bozo cannot really be held responsible for the limitations of French declassification policy. The book is well written and painstakingly researched. This is a valuable addition to the historical literature on the Iraq War, which also improves our understanding of intra-alliance bargaining and coalition building at the UN Security Council.

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The Diversity Bargain and Other Dilemmas of Race, Admissions, and Meritocracy at Elite Universities by Natasha K. Warikoo. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2016. 320 pp. \$26.00.

In August 2017, white nationalists marched on the University of Virginia (UVA), brandishing torches as they gathered around a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee. Today, selective colleges and universities—both public ones like Virginia as well as private ones such as Harvard, Brown, and Oxford—find themselves grappling with their racial pasts at a political moment when racial anxieties are high. How do students on these campuses make sense of it, and the broader opportunity structure in which they are situated? The defiant chants of protestors in Charlottesville (for example, “You will not replace us” and “blood and soil,” a Nazi cry) offer a glimpse into one mental model on race, although most at this protest were not themselves UVA students. In *The Diversity Bargain*, the contextualized narratives elicited from Natasha K. Warikoo's interviews with college students at three elite U.S. and English universities provide another glimpse into present thinking about race and opportunity.

Warikoo's carefully designed research into student views on admissions provides insight into wider frames about race and opportunity because selection of those whom society agrees are its best and brightest, into universities similarly deemed best, offer “proof that meritocracy and equal opportunity are flourishing” (p. 181). Admissions is especially symbolic in the United States, where success in obtaining access to the top tier of the postsecondary sector has become its own mechanism for legitimating status distinctions. The book adds to works by Stevens, Khan, and Gaztambide-Fernandez in discussing mechanisms and paradoxes of modern meritocracy. Warikoo also joins a rising tide of critical perspectives on diversity. Such scholars as Berrey, Ahmed, and