problem he perceptively critiques in other defenses – contestable moral philosophies, the ultimate ground being one of Weber’s warring gods. Olson’s account here is convincing, and it is intended to supplement, not replace those thicker social and economic philosophies. But it also raises questions: How well does a political conception of welfare stand above the fray of competing substantive economic/social philosophies? Does such a political conception succeed in generating consensus to the extent that it empties the political of content, and if that is the case, does it risk replicating the very thin, procedural politics that renders welfare suspect in the first place?

Finally, it would be interesting (and important) to explore reflexive democracy as applied to those formal political statuses that are something less than full citizenship and something more than outsider. How does reflexive democracy work on and in relation to the rights of children, of resident aliens, and undocumented immigrants? In addition to the forms of marginalization, disempowerment, and exclusion in current welfare policy critiqued here, the issue of social benefits for undocumented immigrants involves fundamental questions about the boundaries of membership and the relationship between social and political rights. Such issues could be illuminated by the theoretical insights developed in this lucid and important book.

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William Bain, an international relations scholar at the University of Aberystwyth in Wales, has produced a fine treatise on the history and ethics of international trusteeship. The following question motivates his book: is there a common normative thread that unites the apparently disparate experiences of the British East India Company in the eighteenth century, the League of Nations mandate system, and contemporary UN-sponsored international administrations over “failed states” such as Kosovo and East Timor? Bain answers the question in the affirmative, and he persuasively shows that the idea of *trusteeship* – understood as a justification for alien rule over populations deemed “unfit” to govern themselves – makes these otherwise quite different experiences intelligible as part of a common narrative.

This project is clearly situated within the “English School” of international relations theory, which posits the existence of an *international society* of states based on common rules and shared normative understandings. Contrary to the Hobbesian view of a purely competitive anarchy, sovereign states are here understood to share a common societal element. However, this society of states grounded in contract and legitimated by mutual consent historically excluded all those peoples who were seen as lacking an autonomous, functioning will and thus could not render consent. Bain’s original theoretical contribution consists in showing that the idea of trusteeship over alien populations, which were understood to be stuck at a lower level of development, ought to be seen as a way of normatively “ordering relations between the society of states and what lay beyond it” (185). This also explains the book’s title: Between Anarchy (among putatively barbaric *outsiders*) and Society (among civilized, sovereign *insiders*).

The exercise of trusteeship over a foreign people invokes an explicitly *paternal* mode of human conduct: the underlying justification is that the freedom of any people that is...
manifestly unable to manage its own affairs may be legitimately interfered with by outsiders,
provided that the goal is to actually improve the welfare of the target society itself. There is an
inherent tension here between the putative obligation of powerful states to assist outsiders in
need, on the one hand, and the moral imperative of human autonomy and self-determination,
on the other. Bain compellingly insists that “an arrangement of trusteeship always entails
a loss of liberty; for a ward must be coerced, just as parents coerce their children, towards
some good for the sake of his own happiness” (2). Hence, the book’s principal intention is
to critically analyze the discourses that have traditionally accompanied trusteeship by the
powerful members of international society over their weaker brethren. But the book is not
merely descriptive; Bain also wants to assess the legitimacy of trusteeship from an explicitly
moral standpoint.

Bain shows how the idea of trusteeship over foreign populations was first systematically
developed in the context of the British colonial administration by the East India Company
during the late eighteenth century. In a world increasingly shaped by Enlightenment thinking
and marked by the American and French Revolutions, the only way of making sense of the
great differences that separated European and non-European worlds was to make distinctions
within the human family in terms of degrees of improvement, development, and maturity.
Hence, while all men were seen as potential brothers in Christian fellowship, human beings
in far-away places were generally understood as “child-like” people attempting to take their
first steps on the ladder of universal progress. The alleged moral obligation of powerful
outsiders to aid the advancement of such “backward” populations provided a powerful
intellectual rationale for colonial rule. In other words, foreign trusteeship was justified as
a means for promoting the welfare of people deemed incapable to choose and realize for
themselves the ends for which they should strive.

Bain is probably at his best when he analyses the historical discourse of trusteeship,
showing how it shaped past colonial endeavors and became progressively institutionalized
in the practice of international society. He notes how the discourse of trusteeship had a
discernible impact on actual colonial administrators, even though the goals of Western
imperial powers and Britain in particular were certainly much less than purely altruistic. On
the one hand, the discourse of trusteeship provided a powerful justification for colonialism in
the language of universalist morality; on the other hand, however, it also provided a powerful
critical instrument for public intellectuals who wished to expose the abuses and exploitative
practices related to colonial rule. Edmund Burke famously launched a passionate attack on
the East India Company, claiming that it had not respected its political and moral obligations
and thus forfeited its right to rule, since “it is in the very essence of every trust to be rendered
accountable” (quoted at 35).

This book is by no means apologetic about past colonial misdeeds, and indeed the author
highlights and indicts the exploitative practices that often accompanied the lofty rhetoric
of trusteeship. For instance, Bain shows how the Congo free state, established by king
Leopold II of Belgium in 1876 with the declared goal of advancing the welfare of the
local population, quickly perverted the idea of trusteeship under a rapacious system of
forced labor and brutal oppression. But the practice of trusteeship evolved over time. The
mandates system established under the League of Nations in 1919 can in many regards be
seen as an explicit reaction to the abuses perpetrated in previous decades. Delegates at the
Paris peace conference rejected the possibility of joint international administration; yet they
specified quite detailed procedures of international supervision “to guard against the sort
of maltreatment and misrule that transpired in the Congo Free State” (79). According to
Bain, the mandate system thus represented the ultimate institutionalization of trusteeship
in international society. Under this system, “backward” peoples first became subjects of
international law, and they could directly appeal to the League of Nations for relief of grievances.

Bain recounts how the legitimacy of trusteeship was increasingly questioned after World War II, as it became more and more difficult for Europeans to justify the assumption that powerful foreigners could rule paternalistically over a subject population without the latter’s explicit consent. The principle of popular self-determination, assertively promoted by the post-war American administration, combined with increasingly militant third-world nationalism to foster a rapid process of decolonization. The historical facts here are generally known; Bain adds to this a detailed analysis of how the progressive triumph of self-determination ideas made trusteeship “an unsustainable practice by definition” (133). By the late 1950s, it seemed that the idea of trusteeship had been relegated to the dustbin of history along with the legitimacy of empire. But the impression was wrong. Since the end of the cold war, it has become increasingly evident that international paternalism is alive and well.

The new paternalism: Bain insists on the phenomenon of “failed states” – torn apart by extreme poverty and civil war – as “one of the distinctive features of post-colonial society” (141). Although such political entities are legally sovereign, they are often de facto unable to govern themselves, due to collapsed governance structures and deep ethnic or sectarian polarization. Failed states provide safe havens for terrorist organizations and destabilize international society more broadly; there is thus a growing sense of urgency among both hard-nosed realists and liberal “idealists” that something needs to be done about them. According to Bain, it is in this very context that the idea of trusteeship has recently experienced a revival. He identifies the international administrations in Kosovo, East Timor, and (to a lesser extent) Bosnia-Herzegovina as clear examples of a new international paternalism. Powerful outsiders – essentially the NATO countries under American leadership – exercise temporary control over the domestic authority structures of weak post-war societies that might otherwise soon collapse into anarchy and renewed ethnic strife.

But today’s international trusteeship is no longer underpinned by civilizational or racialist arguments; it needs to be multilateral in order to be legitimate, and its principal aim is to neutralize perverse domestic incentives in weak post-war societies. Perhaps Bain is thus slightly too quick in his conclusion, when he asserts that “the idea of trusteeship itself is hopelessly flawed” (167). Peace might not have lasted for long in places like Bosnia or East Timor, without peacekeeping by the international society of states and some temporary external control over domestic political processes. In conclusion, and notwithstanding Bain’s assertion to the contrary, state sovereignty has little independent value apart from the benefits that it provides for individual human beings. Probably what we need at this point is a full-fledged normative theory of international paternalism, which would clearly specify when trusteeship – as well as “softer” forms of international oversight and conditionality – are morally legitimate, and how trustees can be made more accountable to the local population. But this is an impressive achievement overall, which shows that historical experience is a necessary starting point for all normative reflections on international trusteeship. The book should be of great interest to both political theorists and normatively or historically inclined scholars of international relations.

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