

membership of TCSOs. In response to TCSO pressure, the World Bank increased participatory decision-making, engaged its critics, and cultivated allies among TCSOs (p. 66). In that sense, TCSO activism confirmed the growing influence of TCSOs on global governance institutions. At the same time, the dynamics of TCSO relations within TCS and its engagement with the World Bank and state governments demonstrated significant imbalances in power between donor and borrower nations, inequalities in North-South interactions, and some features of political elitism whereby certain civil society actors used their connections to advance the interests of some stakeholders over those of others (p. 67). What is perhaps even more concerning is the impact of TCSO actions on the populations and governments of developing countries, which under particular circumstances can lead to the marginalization of governments in a developing country, thereby undermining the democratic legitimacy of TCSOs. Overall, given the complexity of the problem, the author concludes his discussion by highlighting the importance of a context-based analysis of TCSOs activities, especially when evaluating their impact on the domestic policies of developing countries (pp. 126–128).

Chapter 7 continues the analysis by examining the two additional cases of the Arun III anti-dam campaign and the World Bank adoption of country systems for procurement. The chapter confirms the earlier findings that although TCS does help improve citizen control over the World Bank, it also continues to manifest significant problems with democratic inputs, demonstrating continuing elitist trends and power imbalances. Chapter 8 summarizes the research findings and addresses the following question: Under what conditions or constraints can TCS become an effective force for the democratization of the World Bank?

The study enriches extant literature on TCS and highlights the current limitations of TCS impact on global governance. While the data collected makes it clear that transnational civil society has global reach and membership, as well as the potential to diversify and democratize global policymaking, the author also demonstrates that this potential has yet to be fully realized. More than commonly acknowledged, TSCOs are atomized and divided by disparities in power and resources between SCOs, whereas the goals, interests, and engagement strategies of CSOs are heavily influenced by the pre-existing beliefs of professional activists, the financial incentives created by their donors, their position in the structure of global governance, and their capacity to exploit state power in advancing their policy agendas.

Transnational civil society has abundant influence on the World Bank, and some changes, like improved transparency and accountability, have facilitated improved stakeholder influence over the institution. However, the most effective channels of influence,

including partnerships with the World Bank's powerful donor states, remain accessible primarily to elite organizations based in the Global North. A strong commitment to pre-existing missions, coupled with financial constraints, inhibit dialogue among organizations and make it difficult for TCSOs to respond to the concerns of local stakeholders. These problems with democratic inputs have adverse consequences for the democratic outputs of TCSOs, often resulting in situations in which the actions of TCSOs do not reflect the interests of affected populations. The book therefore reaches the fundamental conclusion that TCS has not only failed to democratize policymaking at the World Bank, but may have actually worsened some stakeholders' marginalization, especially if they hail from developing countries. At the same time, the author remains positive and proposes four policy initiatives that could fix the existing problems and strengthen TCS's impact on global governance: increasing formal dialogues between the Bank and civil society; limiting state power in Bank decisions; holding individual TCSOs accountable; and making TCS more representative of those populations on whose behalf TCSOs actually speak (pp. 162–164).

Pallas's book makes a valuable contribution to the literature on TCS and its role in global governance. It provides insights into the various factors that undermine TCS's democratic credentials and weaken the autonomy and sovereignty of governments in developing countries. I highly recommend this volume to anyone committed to understanding the ambiguous impact of TCSOs on global governance and pondering the question of what changes are required in the current operation of TCS to finally realize the ultimate goal of establishing a more democratic international order.

Reassuring The Reluctant Warriors: U.S. Civil-Military Relations and Multilateral Interventions. By Stefano

Recchia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. 296p. \$39.95.
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— Harvey M. Sapolsky, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

It is always reassuring to be told that soldiers are reluctant warriors. The popular image, too often cultivated by academics with big agendas and little military experience, is that of senior military leaders advocating yet another war. In Stefano Recchia's careful study of American military interventions in the post-Cold War years, it is the civilian politicians and senior political appointees who are the ones pressing for war and the military leaders looking for reasons to avoid a fight.

Recchia seeks to understand why the United States, the world's dominant power, endures the political costs of bargaining with problematic friends and difficult foes to gain the approval of international organizations like the United Nations, or even alliances like NATO, for its interventions when the substantive assistance these

organizations provide is usually quite limited. It is, he argues, because of the reluctant warriors, America's military leaders who see interventions as tar pits, absorbing resources and tying down troops in forever occupations. The endorsements of international organizations are their light at the end of the tunnel, the promise of burden sharing.

Some might hope that the scramble for formal international approval as American political leaders consider armed interventions is the internalization of an evolving international norm. The United States might have the military muscle to intervene, but the international community has the necessary legitimacy to dispense. Others might see a concerted effort to get friends and foes to offer their approval for America's next military action as the attempt to mitigate possible negative issue linkages, such as trade or arms control, that might result from the adventure. Not so according to Recchia. Norms are not being followed and linkages seldom matter much to American political leaders. Rather, it is domestic political support that is being sought, and that comes mostly by reassuring the American military that international partners will take their place, letting them escape yet another foreign hell hole that the politicians have found for them.

Recchia tests his argument in four detailed cases studies of American intervention—Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq. The missions to Haiti and Bosnia had UN Security Council backing, Kosovo gained NATO Council support, and Iraq was a “coalition of the willing” enterprise without the endorsement of any major international body and thus without many non-American military participants. The promoters of the missions were civilians drawn from different ends of the political spectrum. During the 1990s it was the liberal internationalists embedded deep in the Bill Clinton administration who sought the use of American forces in coup burdened Haiti and in the ethnically torn former Yugoslavia. For Iraq it was the civilian neo-cons in the George W. Bush administration who advocated the invasion of Iraq.

The case studies are rich in candid insight, supported as they are by interviews with most of the key officials, both civilian and military. The pattern is clear. During the Clinton years, the military was foot dragging, undermining the administration's humanitarian interventionist leanings both by stirring up doubts in the Congress and the public and by emphasizing the risks in administration councils. According to Recchia, the Bush administration invasion advocates had much less vocal military opposition in part because the Bush administration had come into office determined to tame the political intransigence of senior military officers, appointing more malleable officers to such positions as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and head of Central Command. The fact that the United States was directly attacked by forces from the Middle East likely also

tempered the military's reaction to their civilian masters' plans. Recchia admits that serious threats to security make reluctant warriors much less reluctant. These are all wars of choice, but sometimes war is a more obvious and acceptable choice.

There are three problems with Recchia's reluctant warrior argument. First, he under examines the partisan role in the debates over America's military interventions. The Republican Party's political advantage in security affairs, acquired in the domestic turmoil over the Vietnam War, dissipated in importance with the end of the Cold War, allowing for Bill Clinton's election as president. Republicans sought to make security salient again by encouraging senior military officers to complain publically about Clinton administration plans and programs. The interventionist inclinations of the administration were easy targets as were its support for gay and women's rights in the military. The return of a Republican to the presidency ended their party's tolerance for senior officer public dissent.

Second, we do not learn enough about why the warriors were so reluctant to accept the Clinton interventions. Stepping into the middle of an ethnic/religious fight, if only to separate the sides and bring humanitarian relief, is a dangerous and thankless task. Moreover, it was obvious from the British experience in Northern Ireland, the Greek and Turkish conflict in Cyprus, and America's own experience in separating Arabs and Israelis in Lebanon, that these efforts have a never-ending quality to them. The American military already had its sights on next big thing after the end of the Cold War, the Chinese challenge. Being a constabulary force was for other, lesser militaries. And given the failure of the Europeans to act effectively in Bosnia and its own bad day in Somalia, it is not surprising that the American military did not want to be in the Balkans.

Third, there is a time problem in the argument. The reluctant warriors of the 1990s became the enthusiastic warriors of the 2000s. Counter-insurgency became doctrinally popular in the American military, topping off in the Iraq and Afghan surges. President Obama's national security team felt sandbagged into growing the “nation building/all-of-government” effort being pushed by the generals. Only the implosions of Generals McChrystal and Petraeus for personal failures saved Obama from making bigger, longer-term commitments in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the meantime, parts of the military, most especially in the Special Operations Command, have found their life's work in doing the missions that the military found so distasteful in the 1990s. Reluctant warriors are not necessarily reluctant forever.

Recchia's basic point stands. The search for approval from international organizations for American interventions is not driven by internalization of norms of international behavior or the desire to protect side interests,

but rather by the desire to convince the American military and the American people that the burdens of hanging around in unpleasant places will be shared with other nations. But burden sharing has its own problems as the American military discovered in air war against Serbia that was part of the Kosovo mission. Coalition participants are governed by their own domestic politics, often limiting their willingness to consent to attacking key targets and the ability of the coalition to implement effective military strategies.

The real reluctant warriors may be the citizens of the United States. American war fighting has been continually modified to reflect their reluctance. The use of the atomic bomb against Japan was justified in part by the great unhappiness of the troops who had fought Germany at the prospect of being transferred to the Pacific to be involved in the amphibious assaults against the Japanese home islands. The war had to end soon or else there would likely have been domestic political consequences. The American military gave up conscription after Vietnam. Reliance on an all-volunteer force rules out long wars with high casualties like Vietnam. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were paid for by borrowing, not by taxes; in fact, taxes were cut during these wars, a first, but surely a happy precedent for the next. Now drones drop the bombs to avoid risking the lives of American pilots. The most frequent war cry these days is “no boots on the ground,” hardly the call of a warrior nation. It is not surprising then that American politicians, anxious for a fight abroad, wistfully claim that a broad-based international coalition can be formed to take up cause. Good luck with that.

Creating Kosovo. International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions. By Elton Skendaj. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014. 248p. \$49.95.
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— Soeren Keil, *Canterbury Christ Church University*

Elton Skendaj's *Creating Kosovo* focuses on international state-building and democratization. The author's main argument is that democratization and state-building are different processes in post-war societies, hence international actors should utilize different strategies to pursue them. In the words of the author, “while effective bureaucracies are most likely to materialize when international organizations insulate public administrators from political and societal influences, democracy is enhanced through international support of public participation and contestation” (p. 3). In other words, he argues that in order to build functional state institutions, it is important that international actors remain the main drivers for a meritocratic recruitment and promotion process, and ensure an ethical work ethos. However, in order to promote democracy, international actors need to promote civil

society and media as control organs, support public engagement with political issues, and strengthen a multi-party system by ensuring free and fair competition rules between political elites.

The argument is presented in six chapters. The first chapter provides the reader with an introduction to the study, a definition of the main terms used, and a literature review on the current debates in state-building and democratization. In the second chapter, titled “Contested Statehood,” the author provides an overview of Kosovo's political development since the late 1980s and highlights how the country's very recent statehood and democratization, as a result of international intervention in the late 1990s, make it an interesting case for the assessment of international state-building and democratization strategies.

The following chapter “Deadly Cocktail” assesses the development of Kosovo's public administration and judicial sector. Skendaj argues that both institutions were seen as very important in the process of building a functional state and ensuring responsiveness towards citizen demands, but they are both seen by international actors, domestic elites, and citizens as highly inefficient, corrupt, and strongly undermined by political patronage and clientelism. Skendaj argues that the main reason for the negative development of these two state institutions is the too early focus on local ownership, which has allowed political elites to fill these institutions with people from their family, friends, and wider patronage networks. This in turn has allowed these institutions to become linked to the interests of certain elites, rather than the population as a whole.

In the following chapter, “Without Fear or Favor,” Skendaj examines the development of the Kosovo police force and the customs service and highlights that these two bureaucracies have become examples of good governance, in that they are seen as less corrupt, more efficient, and more strongly driven by a work ethos that is committed to serving Kosovo's citizens. In search for an explanation of the different development of these institutions when compared with the judicial system and the public administration, Skendaj argues that the police and customs service remained longer under the direct control of international actors. These actors ensured that recruitment was based on a meritocratic system rather than on family and patronage links, and they promoted a work ethos that focused on efficiency, commitment, and a stronger sense of serving the state and all of its citizens.

In Chapter five, Skendaj focuses on the role of democratization in post-war Kosovo, and highlights some of the developments in Kosovo and the influence of international actors. He comes to the conclusion that mass mobilization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as international support for democratic oversight after 2001, have strengthened democratization tendencies